


4284



OCDE/OECD

ORGANISATION DE COOPÉRATION ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUES
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

CILSS

COMITÉ PERMANENT INTER-ÉTATS DE LUTTE CONTRE LA SÉCHERESSE DANS LE SAHEL
PERMANENT INTERSTATE COMMITTEE FOR DROUGHT CONTROL IN THE SAHEL

CLUB DU SAHEL



SAHEL D(85)277
November, 1985

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

ANALYSIS
OF
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
TO
THE SAHEL

1892

ANALYSIS
OF
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
TO
THE SAHEL

Note by the Secretariat of the Club du Sahel
with the assistance of its consultants

Mr. Clark G. Ross
and
Mr. Jacques Giri

The views expressed and facts given in this document are the
sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the viewpoints of the OECD or the CILSS

ANALYSIS

OF

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

BY

THE BOARD

OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
AND THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

AND

THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
AND THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE

A BRIEF QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) TO THE SAHEL	5
SUMMARY	5
I. The Role of ODA in the CILSS Member Countries	7
II. Policy Issues	14
ENDNOTES	15

PART TWO

RECONSIDERING OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) TO THE SAHEL	19
I. The Outlook for ODA to the Sahel	19
II. Supporting the Continued Existence of the Sahel ..	21
III. Developing the Sahel.....	23
IV. Coordination	25

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

1. SHORT OVERVIEW ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 1

2. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 2

3. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 3

4. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 4

5. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 5

Page

6. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 6

7. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 7

8. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 8

9. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 9

10. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 10

11. ANALYSIS OF THE DOCUMENTS 11

PART ONE

A BRIEF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
OF
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE SAHEL

by

The Secretariat of the Club du Sahel
with the assistance
of

Mr. Clark G. Ross
Consultant

Page One

A large quantity of
of
with the equipment and the ground

by

The Government of the State of
with the Secretary
of

of the State of
the Secretary

A BRIEF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE (ODA) TO THE SAHEL

SUMMARY

1. The real value of official development assistance flows to the Sahel increased between 1975 and 1981 but it declined in the two following years. The declining trend was reversed in 1984, essentially because of considerable amounts of emergency assistance given in response to a severe drought.

2. Aid trends should be placed in the perspective of the unfavourable economic situation and prospects of CILSS Member countries. Concessional aid flows should increase to stem decline and stimulate recovery. But improved aid results are linked to future reforms in domestic and aid policies.

3. The sector distribution of aid and national investments has not been brought in line with the Sahel governments' priorities of food production and improved ecology control.

4. The debt problem weighs heavily on the economic and social prospects of most CILSS Member countries. There is an urgent need for more comprehensive and longer-term solutions to alleviate the debt burden.

TABLE I-1 COUNTRY : Sahel Region

VALUE AND COMPOSITION OF ODA
(U.S. \$ and %)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	Mean	S.D. (d)
1. ODA Commitments (million \$) (a)	817	1136	1002	1378	1623	1502	1972	1513	1488	1381	329
Real Value - 1980 (b)	1277	NA	1392	1660	1764	1502	1992	1544	1472	1601	213
2. Net Disbursements(mil \$)	651	709	736	1105	1192	1202	1404	1284	1243	1058	266
3. Net Disb/Commitments (%)	80	62	74	80	73	80	72	85	84	77	7
4. Population (Million)	27.4	28.0	28.7	29.5	30.2	31.0	31.8	32.7	33.6	--	--
5. ODA Commitment/Capita(\$)	29.8	40.6	34.9	46.7	53.7	48.5	62.0	46.3	44.3	45.2	9.0
Real Value-1980 \$ (b)	46.7	NA	NA	54.4	58.3	48.5	62.7	47.2	43.4	51.6	6.5
6. Net Disb. Per Capita (\$)	23.8	25.3	25.6	37.5	39.5	39.0	44.2	39.3	37.0	34.5	7.1
7. Non-Project Asst(\$)(c)	42	34	38	39	29	44	33	31	NA	36	5.0
8. Food Aid (%)	21	10	8	11	7	9	10	10	14	11.11	4.2
9. Budget & Bal. of Pymnts support (%)	4	11	14	10	10	17	9	5	3	9.2	4.6
10. Project Asst (c) %	58	66	62	61	71	56	67	69	NA	64	5.1
11. Rural Development Proj %	22	29	27	23	21	22	34	39	25	27	6.1
12. Rainfed Agriculture %	5	10	10	7	8	10	10	11	11	9	2.3
13. Reforestation %	0.4	0.5	0.9	1	1	3	2	1	2	1.6	1

(a) Club du Sahel estimates except for 1983 (O.E.C.D.)

(b) Using World Bank deflator

(c) Line 7 & 10 always equal 100%

(d) Standard Deviation

Sources: For a discussion of data sources, see endnotes

I THE ROLE OF ODA IN THE CILSS MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. Volume

Key indicators of trends for the Sahel region as a whole show that the current value of aid commitments declined from its highest annual value in 1981 (about \$1.9 billion) to a lower level in 1983 (\$1.4 billion). The declining trend was reversed in 1984 essentially because of considerable increases of emergency assistance. In 1984 total ODA commitments amounted to \$1.9 billion. When expressed in real terms, adjusted for price and exchange rates, the value of ODA commitments in 1983 was only slightly higher than the 1975 value. It had increased during the 1975-81 period but it fell during the two following years. There was a trend correction in 1984.

The grant share of ODA varied from a low of 57 per cent in 1979 to a high of 67 per cent in 1980 and amounted to 62 per cent in 1983.

The net disbursement/commitment ratio did not change markedly during the 1975-1983 period. It was, on average, approximately 77 per cent. In future, however, growing debt service could significantly increase the difference between commitments and net disbursements unless some debt relief is provided to the Sahelian countries.

The population of the Sahel continues to grow at an alarming rate of 2.5 per cent or more on annual average. Such a rapid population increase tends to dilute the real value of both national income gains and ODA. The combination of population growth and stagnant aid commitments caused the real value of aid per capita to fall since 1981 and to decline in 1983 as compared with 1975. ODA per capita levels are, nevertheless, generous in the Sahel compared to levels in other Third World countries. They amounted to \$44 in 1983 as compared to \$20 for sub-Saharan Africa excluding the Sahel and \$9 to Asia. The favourable treatment given to the Sahel can be explained by the CILSS countries' poverty, the persistent drought cycle, off and on, since 1969 and the attempt to minimize the effects of many external and internal shocks.

2. Aid flows in perspective

In current dollars, the value for the GNP of the eight CILSS member countries increased from 4.8 billion dollars in 1975 to 7.8 billion in 1983, an annual average rate of growth of 6.1 per cent. In real terms, however, using constant dollars, there was essentially no change in GNP for the Sahel region during that period. In spite of the unreliability and incompleteness of statistics for the Sahel, the economic performance of the CILSS countries has been clearly unsatisfactory (Table I-2). Estimated per capita GNP increased from \$177 in 1975 to \$232 in 1983 in current dollars, which represented a 3.4 per cent annual growth rate. When expressed in constant dollars, however, the real GNP per capita was 17 per cent lower in 1983 than the estimated real per capita GNP in 1975. The poor economic performance of the Sahelian countries coupled with the rapid population growth combined to produce this discouraging result.

The economic deterioration in the Sahel has been due to a series of internal and external shocks including droughts, wars, recession and inflation in the industrial countries, high and volatile interest and exchange rates, and a collapse of commodity prices. Poor domestic policies also played a major role. Serious internal and external problems confronted economies with weak institutional structures and governments committed to over-ambitious expenditure programmes. In addition, the droughts exposed the Sahel's principal policy failure: its neglect of agriculture and ecology.

Aid commitments were generous in response to a series of internal and external problems. They averaged approximately 20 per cent of regional GNP between 1975 and 1983 and increased in 1984. Table I-3 shows that there are considerable variations between CILSS member countries in the aid commitment to GNP ratio. Many factors explain these variations but the magnitude of the food aid allocations is one important factor. Thus, in trying to analyze the contribution of ODA to an individual country's economy, care should be taken to examine the relative importance of food aid and, if possible, its use. Other types of contributions would require equally close scrutiny to estimate their economic and social impact.

Sahelian countries continue to have significant trade deficits, as shown in Table I-2. The trade deficits have been covered by short-term capital inflows and longer-term borrowings which have increased the external debt. Austerity measures have significantly reduced annual trade deficits in most recent years.

Since a large proportion of aid flows is in exchangeable foreign currencies, ODA is one means to offset a balance of trade deficit. During the 1975-1983 period, the annual ratio of ODA commitments to the region's trade balance was 1.5. Recently, however, increases in the trade deficit and lower ODA commitments have reduced that ratio to approximately 1.2 (Table I-2). One of the effects of ODA reductions for the Sahel countries is the reduced ability to offset trade deficits. As a consequence, countries must either make adjustments to limit imports or increase external borrowing.

3. Sector distribution

The division between project and non-project aid is, on average, approximately 65 and 35 per cent respectively but this division may be misleading. Substantial elements of project aid such as the payment of salaries, local costs, logistics and other benefits extended by projects to local personnel are indirect forms of general budgetary support which are widespread. While these contributions may be justified, they also tend to encourage current consumption at the expense of long-term investment. It is not possible to determine the magnitude of the diversion of project aid to general budgetary support but the amounts are not insignificant.

TABLE I-2

COUNTRY : Sahel Region

IMPORTANCE OF ODA TO SELECTIVE ECONOMIC INDICATORS
(U.S. \$ and %)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
1. GNP (\$ millions) Current	4833	5040	5400	6235	7265	8230	7950	7400	7820
2. GNP/Capita (\$ millions) Current	7551	180	188	212	240	8230	250	266	7743
3. ODA Commitment/Capita (\$ millions) Current	277	40.6	34.9	46.7	53.7	266	62	46.3	232
4. Ratio 3/2	29.8	.23	.19	.22	.22	266	.25	.21	230
5. Exports (\$ millions)	.17	1132	1352	1135	1561	48.5	.18		44.3
6. Imports (\$ millions)	933	1485	1928	2198	2741	.18			.19
7. Trade Balance (\$ millions)	1539	-353	-576	-1063	-1180	1669	1497	1269	1580
8. ODA Commitment (\$ millions)	-606	1136	1002	1378	1623	3272	3025	3097	2772
9. Commitments/Trade Balance	817	3.2	1.7	1.3	1.4	-1603	-1528	-1828	-1192
10. Debt Disbursed (a) (\$ millions)	1.4	1456	1750	2370	2785	1502	1972	1513	1488
11. Debt (includes undisbursed) (\$ millions) (a)	1090	2659	3134	4029	4823	0.9	1.3	0.8	1.2
12. Debt as % of GNP	1989	23	33	38	38	3332	3795	4488	4900
13. Debt per capita (\$)	29	52	61	81	92	5871	6258	7280	--
14. Debt Service (millions \$) Year 1987: 621	40					40	48	61	63
15. Debt Service as % Exports						108	119	137	146
16. Debt Service as % of GNP									499
									32
									6.4

Source: See endnotes

(a) World Bank estimates, generally lower than those of the O.E.C.D. - See Table I-4 for a comparison for 1982

Food aid is an important component of non-project assistance. The food aid component of ODA has been rising steadily from 7 per cent of total commitments in 1979 to 14 per cent in 1983 and close to 20 per cent in 1984. Counterpart funds generated by food aid have provided an increasing share of indirect budget support since 1980 when direct budgetary and balance of payments contributions started to decline.

Statistical analysis of ODA for most recent years seems to indicate a fall of the proportion of rural development projects in total commitments as compared with the levels of the preceding years. The share of rainfed agriculture projects which was increasing between 1975 and 1982 stagnated in following years as did the share of projects for rainfed food crops. Irrigation projects have entered a phase of consolidation until management, maintenance and the economic environment is more propitious to their success. While experience has shown how difficult it is to be successful in food production projects, given the technical economic and social environment in the Sahel, the aid levels are very low relative to the priority goal, which is to increase food production.

4. The debt problem

In 1983, the total disbursed external debt of the CILSS Member countries amounted to 4.5 billion dollars according to World Bank estimates and 5.6 billion dollars according to OECD estimates. These amounts may seem small compared to the debt levels of some other Third World countries but debt has become a major burden for the Sahel. Tables I-2 and I-4 show that per capita debt for the Sahel, as a region, has increased from \$40 (1975) to at least \$146 (1983), representing in excess of 60% of GNP, for 1983, while total debt for all low and middle income countries is closer to 30%. The major part of the debt is owed to or guaranteed by official sources in western creditor countries.

Currently, interest and principal repayments, using World Bank estimates, average 6.4 per cent of CILSS member countries' GNP and 32 per cent of exports. Comparable figures for all low and middle income countries are 4 per cent of GNP and 19 per cent of exports. With the exception of Burkina and Chad, all the Sahelian countries have debt burdens which are unsustainable in relation to their resources and their growth prospects.

Projections of 1983 ODA commitments and debt servicing obligations show that, during the period 1985-1987, many CILSS Member countries would have lower net capital inflows, in real terms, than during the 1980-82 period. Looking 10 years ahead (1995) a simplified scenario combining projected current aggregate value of ODA flows, unchanged population growth rates and increases in debt servicing show that the per capita 1995 value of net ODA would only be 40 per cent of its current level (Table I-5). Given population trends and debt servicing obligations, the real value of ODA would have to increase at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent if its real present value were to be maintained in 1995.

TABLE I-3

ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF ODA BY COUNTRY
Commitments as % GNP (1975-1983)

	Range (a)	Mean	SD	CV (b)	% Total ODA as Food Aid Mean (c)
Burkina	16-24	20	2	.10	10
Cape Verde	35-131	79	33	.41	38
Chad	14-30	19	7	.37	21
The Gambia	20-66	38	16	.42	15
Mali	16-35	24	6	.25	9
Mauritania	18-87	38	22	.58	13
Niger	11-24	15	4	.27	10
Senegal	7-15	11	3	.27	11
The Sahel	17-25	21	3	.14	11

(a) Maximum and minimum percentage during the 1975-1983 period

(b) SD divided by the Mean

(c) % of ODA being food aid - annual Mean 1975-1983

Sources: For a discussion of data sources, see endnote

TABLE I-4

DEBT IN THE SAHEL 1982

	Total Debt (\$ million)		Debt Per Capita \$		Debt Per GNP %	
	World Bank	OECD	World Bank	OECD	World Bank	OECD
Burkina	335	376	52	58	29	33
Cape Verde	61	81	199	270	56	74
Chad	189	178	41	39	59	56
The Gambia	149	176	219	235	71	84
Mali	822	1033	116	146	80	100
Mauritania	1000	1148	626	718	147	169
Niger	603	886	103	151	40	59
Senegal	1329	1807	220	300	55	75
The Sahel	4488	5685	137	174	61	77

Sources: For a discussion of data sources, see endnotes

TABLE I-5

FUTURE VALUE OF CURRENT (1983) ODA COMMITMENTS
(U.S. \$)

	1983	1985	1987	1990	1995
1. Population (millions)	33.56	35.19	36.86	39.56	44.48
2. ODA Commitment (mil \$)	1488	1488	1488	1488	1488
3. ODA Commitment/Capita (\$)	44.3	42.3	40.1	37.6	33.5
4. Debt Service (a) (millions \$)	495	582	613	720	941
5. Net Commitments (Commitments Minus Debt Service) (millions \$)	993	906	875	768	547
6. Net Commitments Per Capita	29.6	25.8	23.7	19.4	12.3
7. ODA Value Needed to Maintain Net Commitment of \$29.6 per Capita (millions \$)	1488	1624	1704	1891	2258

(a) From "La Dette Exterieur Des Pays du CILSS", Club du Sahel 1985

Source: See Section V for a discussion of data sources

II POLICY ISSUES

Separate notes on aid quality and co-ordination are presented to the Sixth Club du Sahel Conference. Yet, a few comments derived from the brief quantitative analysis above are listed in the following paragraphs:

Aid volume and quality : future aid volume issues and aid quality issues are linked. While the poor economic prospects of the CILSS member countries in the medium-term argue in favour of substantial increases of concessional assistance, the results of a renewed aid effort are unlikely to meet the expectations unless significant policy reforms are carried out by CILSS member countries and donor agencies. Real co-ordination among donors and with CILSS members should be one of the important themes of reform. A long-term and integrated vision rather than a short-term and fragmented outlook for domestic and aid policies should be another issue for consideration. Discreet and dispersed projects have been on the whole disappointing but there are, as yet, no well thought-through alternative approaches.

Sector allocation : Aid flows and national investments need to be brought in line with development priorities. They should take into account local conditions, resources and skills. While food production and environmental rehabilitation are theoretically accepted priorities for all partners, they have not, in practice, become the focus of development efforts. The success of future food and ecology programmes is linked to political, economic and social change in the Sahel and donors are more likely to be forthcoming if these changes take place.

Debt problems : The Club du Sahel is not the forum in which debt problems can be addressed but these problems cannot be ignored. The debt burden weighs so heavily on the economic and social future of the Sahel countries that all the possible means of debt relief should be sought. There are many precedents to consider. They range from straightforward debt cancellation to debt conversion into local currency, refinancing on concessional terms, stretching out the time during which debt can be reimbursed, reducing its cost, and insuring that net transfers remain positive by substantially increasing the volume of programme assistance. There is an urgent need for more comprehensive and longer-term solutions to the Sahel countries' debt burden.

ENDNOTES

1. The Sahelian countries are Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal.
2. CILSS, Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel, is comprised of the eight Sahelian countries and is headquartered in Burkina.
3. Statistical data sources for Tables II-1,2 are described below. The estimates of ODA come from the Club du Sahel's annual report on official ODA to the CILSS countries. Official Development Assistance to CILSS Member Countries in 1983. The OECD also publishes annually a report entitled Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries which provides estimates of ODA flows. These latter statistics differ from Club du Sahel estimates, since the Club's estimates are from a larger group of donors and have slightly different definitions. However, the OECD's estimates were used for Senegal and Mali in 1983. The real values of ODA shown are estimates in 1980 dollars using the World Bank deflator which takes into account both price changes in the OECD countries and parity changes between the dollar and national currencies. (See: World Development report, 1984, Table 18, page 252.) The population and GNP estimates are from recent editions of the World Development Report and recent World Bank country studies. The estimates for imports and exports are from the International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics, 1982-1984 editions.
4. The World Bank estimates of debt for each country, generally provided by the country itself, do not include IMF drawings, short-term loans, trade arrears to non-financial enterprises or private non-guaranteed borrowing. The OECD estimates, generally provided by creditors, include all external debt except IMF drawings and a few minor, irregular items.

PART TWO

A BRIEF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
OF
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE SAHEL

by

The Secretariat of the Club du Sahel
with the assistance
of

Mr. Jacques Giri
Consultant

1917-1918

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

ANNUAL REPORT AND STATEMENT OF EXPENDITURES

for

the year ending June 30, 1918

with the cash balance

on

July 1, 1917

and the cash balance

RECONSIDERING OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) TO THE SAHEL

I. THE OUTLOOK FOR PUBLIC AID TO THE SAHEL

The first part of this report, entitled "A Brief Quantitative Analysis of Official Development Assistance to the Sahel" clearly points out the difficulties which Sahelian governments and donors will be encountering in the next few years. It shows that:

- with the population of the Sahel continuing to grow, and
- with the external debt service also continuing to rise during the next ten years,

the total volume of aid, in real terms, will have to be increased by about 40% in ten years, simply to maintain net per capita aid to the Sahel at the present level.

Would keeping aid at the current net per capita level really permit the Sahelian economies to develop? Would it allow the economies to stay at their current levels? If we review the experience of the past few years, the answers to these questions are not necessarily positive; in fact, one may wonder if raising aid even by 40% would still not be enough to stop the downward move of the Sahelian economies.

We know that some of the aid given to the Sahel actually supports that region's continued existence; even the survival, for instance, of those people threatened by starvation and the continuance of public and para-statal institutions which have grown faster than the rates of population growth and internal production. The analysis of aid prepared in 1980 for presentation at the Fourth Club Conference at Kuwait had already called attention to the fact that a growing portion of aid was going to "survival" of the region and not to development activities. In spite of unreliable data, it appears that this trend has not been reversed.

This means that, unless changes occur, a declining portion of aid will go to economic development. And given the poor results over the last ten years in terms of the economic development of the Sahel, we fear that the results of the next ten years may be even worse, with the region slipping even further downhill.

Can improved climatic conditions help reverse this decline? It is unlikely; more rains will, at best, cause a reduction in food aid. Can we expect an improvement in the international economic environment to give a boost to the Sahelian economies? Most

experts do not expect a substantial increase in prices of primary exports from the Sahel over the next few years, so this does not offer much hope. On the other hand, factors such as the decline of the dollar, falling interest rates and lower prices of petroleum products, could lessen the pressures on Sahelian economies. But we shouldn't expect this relief to bring miracles.

We must recognize as well that general economic and aid statistics do not reflect the impacts of the environmental degradation which is affecting more and more areas of the Sahel. This degradation will surely have an impact on the performance of the livestock and agricultural sectors and, therefore, on overall economic indicators.

In these conditions, it would appear that attempts to improve the effectiveness of aid should become a priority matter for donors as well as Sahelians. Reflections on aid within the context of the Club du Sahel and elsewhere have been going on for several years without resulting in any major changes. Shouldn't this reflection be further intensified? Shouldn't the analyses be advanced to the point where we really have an understanding of on the reasons for the poor effectiveness of aid? And is not a re-thinking of the nature of aid to the region required?

This paper does not claim to offer ready solutions to the problem of aid effectiveness but suggests some paths for future reflection.

II. SUPPORTING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE SAHEL

All aid donors are fully aware that for now and many years to come Sahelian societies cannot survive without external aid. All donors are also aware that the manner in which this aid is provided also affects the future of the region. With this dual awareness in mind, have all the practical consequences been understood?

Food Aid

Whatever the future climate conditions, everyone realizes that the Sahel countries will not be able to do without food aid for a number of years. It is also generally admitted that food aid has often had a negative impact on trends in production systems, that it has acted as a disincentive to farmers and that it has widely served as a subsidiser of public marketing boards, which have been inefficient. But food aid can and should play a positive role, contributing to improved production systems that are less vulnerable to climate changes.

Food aid has contributed to domestic food production (or should have contributed) through the use of counterpart funds generated by sales of the food aid. One could also envisage the use of food aid for those rural populations which need it, in exchange for work in areas such as natural resource improvement and water supply, etc.

In either case, food aid can have a positive impact on the development of the region only if, prior to the onset of the crisis, its role has been examined and defined and if a coherent programme of investments involving financial or human resources (or a combination of them) can be implemented on the basis of this aid. If such a programme has not been prepared before a crisis situation has appeared, then it is practically impossible to put one together at the last moment. Moreover, if the crisis has set in and people are fleeing the countryside for cities and refugee camps, one can only put together a patchwork plan at the last minute to avoid human disaster without any longer-term benefits to the future of the region.

Sahelian governments and donors have started to improve their ability to forecast food crises, get food aid dispatched and means of transportation in place within the desired timeframe. However, much more needs to be done to improve management of food aid so that it contributes effectively to improved rural production systems.

Shouldn't donors and Sahelian governments be giving more thought to this crucial point: stop adopting the easy solutions (often the case during the 1984-85 period, notably free distribution of emergency food aid) and start preparing plans immediately for using food aid for more constructive purposes?

Operations of the Public Services

Some aid clearly is earmarked to cover costs of public and para-statal operations in the Sahel, such as budget support to these countries. Another part of aid, harder to estimate but certainly no small amount, also covers operational costs though it is more or less indirect and harder to separate out. What so-called "development" project does not contain directly or indirectly some component covering operating costs of an institution or development organisation in the Sahel? An evaluation of development projects of one donor, more forthright than most, reported that some of these projects really appeared to be excuses for allowing public offices to keep operating.

Aid has contributed, and continues to contribute, both in terms of investment and operations, to the growth of the public and para-statal sectors. At the same time, it has become increasingly evident that Sahelian states are caught in a contradiction between an unproductive sector which has grown and is still growing very rapidly and a productive sector which is finding it more and more difficult to carry the burden of all kinds of public services. At the core of the matter, isn't the problem of recurrent costs simply the inability of the Sahelian economies to handle the burden of costs created by development projects which are supposed to increase productivity (but obviously they do not increase it enough) and to raise the quality of life of its people?

To be sure, social needs in the Sahel remain very high, especially in the areas of education and health. But should aid keep contributing to intolerably mounting "overhead" costs, making the region increasingly dependent on external aid, even in the vital sectors? Or wouldn't it be better to curb the increase of the unproductive sectors until growth in the productive sectors is sufficient to allow the Sahel states themselves to advance?

With each new development project proposal, shouldn't longer-term concerns move both Sahelian governments and donors to ask the question: "Would this project really enhance the productive base of the economy?" And if the answer is negative, shouldn't such an activity be postponed until the Sahelian economies are capable of handling it?

III. DEVELOPING THE SAHEL

The first goal of the 1984 revised Strategy for Drought Control and Development in the Sahel, which is being presented to the Sixth Conference of the Club du Sahel, is "to ensure that the men and women of the Sahel once again play an active role in their own development", which is a new element compared with earlier versions of the strategy.

This goal emerges from the observation that for 25 years it has been expected that development occurs as a result of "projects", set up as independent units, conceived by national governments with the concurrence of donors (or vice-versa); in any case, projects which are external to the people. This approach has had some spotty success but it has not brought about the needed changes in Sahelian production systems fast enough to overcome the effect of high population growth rates and the rise in urban populations.

In recent years it has become increasingly obvious that development does not occur by fiat but rather is the achievement of the populations themselves. The only useful things that governments and donors can do are to create favorable conditions for development and then to reinforce this development, especially by providing necessary investment inputs.

Such an approach, which is fairly new - and if it becomes accepted and adopted, which up to now has not really happened - represents a major change from the concept of development "projects".

First, changing project goals. If development is the achievement of people, the chances of seeing it effectively take place when it is conceived by governments and donors are pretty slim. There are plenty of reasons to believe that people-oriented projects are not the same as projects which are conceived, designed and evaluated by central governments; the latter may be the work of properly motivated and highly competent individuals but they are usually separate from the populations concerned. And we have not adequately pointed out the inherent contradiction between typical projects which are designed to launch a kind of pre-programmed development and the desire to "return to the men and women of the Sahel an active role in their own development".

This does not necessarily mean that projects should be abandoned but it does mean that our approach to projects must be seriously reviewed and revised. One suggestion, for example, would be to limit projects to the setting of general objectives without defining specific detailed activities, but maintaining a flexibility which would allow development to be adapted to the role of the various players.

Moreover, it should be absolutely necessary, starting from the design phase, for projects to state explicitly what conditions are required to assure achievement of the objectives and how these conditions will be carried out. The projects must define the policy framework in which the project objectives will be achieved, explain how this framework is being set up and define the various management responsibilities and obligations of the different concerned parties.

This would certainly avoid the wastage of financial and human resources on projects whose failure is almost guaranteed from the beginning, given the inherent difference between the "logic" of projects and the "logic" (ways of thinking) of the people. Can't we affirm, for example, that most projects based on "mobilizing" (animation in French) or "sensitizing" the target populations are destined to failure by the simple fact that these populations are being forced to adopt other ways of reasoning? Sahelian peasants do not behave differently from other groups of people and in general people do not allow themselves to be "sensitized" or dragged into new kinds of behavior they believe to be against their own interests. Shouldn't the underlying socio-economic conditions which explain the reasons for their behavior be changed before we can hope to change the behavior patterns themselves?

The lessons from the failures of the past two decades have not always been spelled out sufficiently, based on more thorough reflection. We tend to look at just the immediate causes, technical or temporal issues (which can always be found) without going deeper to find the real conditions underlying the success or failure of the activities.

Finally, a new approach has implications for the manner in which we programme budgets. If the people themselves should have the primary role in their own development, how can precise budget calculations be defined in advance when we do not know in what form the real development will take place? Don't we need a lot more flexibility? For instance, we could agree upon a grand total for a project, including the expected requirements for infrastructure, costs of services and commodities, supporting research, training, etc. - in short, everything that would be covered by external assistance based on the ability to anticipate requirements - without detailed, itemized budgeting in advance.

The multiplicity of projects and donors funding them has made it harder and harder, in recent years, for Sahelian governments to manage this mountain of projects effectively. Shouldn't this lead us to undertake a review of how projects are managed? And shouldn't we be taking another look at how project activities are identified so that they are better adapted to the needs of the populations, are more consistent with the underlying realities of development and easier to manage?

IV. COORDINATION

To improve the effectiveness of development aid to the Sahel, shouldn't much more of a concerted and coordinated effort be made among donors, among CILSS countries and between the two groups? The document titled "The Club du Sahel and the Common Programme of Aid Agencies and Sahelians" (SAHEL D(85)281) makes some specific proposals in this respect which, if they were accepted, could allow for more significant progress than we have seen to date.

Appendix

The following table shows the results of the survey conducted in the year 1960. The table is divided into two main sections: the first section shows the results of the survey conducted in the year 1960, and the second section shows the results of the survey conducted in the year 1961. The results are presented in the following table: