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WEST AFRICAN LONG TERM PERSPECTIVES

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

CILSS

Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel

Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel

BAD/ADB

Banque Africaine de Développement
African Development Bank

REPORT OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

Brussels, January 17-19, 1994

SAH/CR(94)82 **General Distribution**

population

land

development

This study is financed by the **EEC** in collaboration with **CIDA**, the **ADB**, the **World Bank**, the **French Cooperation**, the **Dutch Cooperation** and **USAID**

The WALTPS study is coordinated by the CINERGIE unit in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. CINERGIE is a joint initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the African Development Bank (ADB).

The study is being conducted jointly by a group of experts based at the Secretariat of the Club du Sahel in Paris and by several groups of African experts in the countries of West Africa. National case studies and the main sectoral studies dealing with political and social change, regional migration, land use planning and management of border areas are being conducted under the direct responsibility of African specialists.

The scientific committee in charge of monitoring the study and defining priorities comprises around twenty people, one-half of whom are researchers from West Africa.

A committee of experts comprised of sixty people is also consulted on a regular basis. Forty-five West African researchers and specialists who are members of this committee form the core of a network of correspondents whose role it is to make constructive comments and recommendations on the study itself as well as to promote the dissemination of its findings in their respective countries.

The CINERGIE unit maintains permanent contact with senior political decision-makers and with the media. A region-wide network of journalists has been set up by the unit to maintain contact with public opinion and mobilize the West African press on the subjects addressed by the study.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the study

The purpose of the West Africa Long Term Perspective Study (WALTPS) is to make a contribution to ongoing discussion and debate about regional cooperation and integration by focusing on the long-term dimension of these issues (one generation hence) and on aspects related to population and settlement dynamics - i.e, the growth and redistribution of people within the region.

Another purpose of the study is to provide African governments and their partners from donor agencies with information and analysis of the main underlying trends, both local and worldwide, that have affected and will continue to affect settlement patterns and spatial, economic and social organization. Potential seeds of change and remaining obstacles are highlighted through analysis of socio-political factors and of their interaction with economic phenomena.

The authors hope to convince African leaders and the rest of the international community to address long term and regional development issues in the framework of a shared vision of the future of West Africa.

Reasons for conducting a regional study

One may wonder whether a regional approach is the best way of addressing development issues in a group of 19 countries [1] with GDP ranging from one to one hundred in size, and among which attempts to foster institutional integration and cooperation have come up against major blockages for so long. Indeed, the study clearly shows that a regional approach is unavoidable for the following main reasons:

- West Africa is characterized by high mobility of populations and the interdependence of the real economies, for which political frontiers have never been a significant constraint. This mobility is likely to continue, and, as a result of population redistribution, countries in the region will become more and more interdependant.

- So far, the potential of the region, which is a patchwork of diverse interests, has been poorly exploited, with declining economic returns, and is increasingly dependent on external forces .

- Finally, a better understanding of population dynamics and of spatial patterns of development is a prerequisite for the Governments in the region to move from words to deeds and for cooperation to materialize.

Reasons for focusing on long term trends in human geography

One may also wonder whether the time is right for in-depth discussion about the long-term future of West Africa. Is it reasonable to concentrate on population dynamics and the links between settlement patterns, economics and society at a time when African countries are in such a difficult economic situation and when the overriding priority is to restore their economies and rebuild their institutions? For a number of reasons listed below, this approach is indeed both reasonable and legitimate.

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[1] Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo

West Africa is undergoing unprecedented population growth. The region had 40 million inhabitants in 1930; in 1990 it had 200 million. Forecasts estimate that this figure will double by the year 2020. The population will thus have undergone a ten-fold increase in less than a century. At the same time, there has been intense migration between different ecological zones, between countries, and between rural areas and urban areas, and this migration has profoundly altered the way the region is structured, the way markets are organized, and the whole economic geography of the region.

Viewed in the short term, these population movements appear to be the consequence of political and economic change. If seen in the long term, however, the concentrations and movements of population have a significant influence on political and economic change and on the sustainability of development in the region.

The redistribution of population is one of the main factors which influence the way individuals and African societies perceive their basic needs and their willingness to change their behavior. The minimum risk strategy for West Africa to accommodate its unprecedented demographic growth without causing an environmental, social and geopolitical disaster and to succeed in resuming sustainable economic growth is to create favorable conditions for a high degree of mobility within the region and to give its people the maximum amount of freedom to decide where to settle.

Organization of the study

The study is based upon a retrospective of the last thirty years which attempts to identify the mechanisms that have enabled societies to adapt to an evolving environment, sometimes through quite significant changes. Some of these changes are mentioned below.

Past trends in population movements, including the reversed migrations experienced during the periods of economic crisis and economic adjustment, show that such movements are rational responses on the part of people to the opportunities and constraints linked to changes in their physical and sociopolitical environment, and also to changes in market forces and in the international environment.

Urbanization is a key component of population dynamics, with far reaching consequences. Urbanization is the first form of the necessary division of labor. Migration to the cities increases the demand for goods and services, including food. It also increases the need for cash income and therefore the productivity of individuals and the mobilization of resources. Urban growth also implies the accumulation of public and private capital, which generates a significant proportion of the economic activities of cities and their hinterlands.

Social changes which result from urbanization have been enormous and have taken place at a remarkably high pace. Within three decades, we have witnessed, at one end of the spectrum, a tenfold increase in the population of the urban informal sector, and, at the other end of the spectrum, the emergence of intellectual and economic elites whose lifestyles are much closer to those in Western societies than in the traditional societies that are still dominant in some areas of rural Africa. With the complicity of its foreign counterpart, the first generation of the urban elite following independence has based its wealth and influence more on rent seeking activities than on the development of the productive potential of the region. Income disparities between social classes have remained high and relatively stable, thanks to a variety of compensating mechanisms which include migrations and the capacity of the elite to adjust its levy on the economy.

However, a new generation of urban entrepreneurs and intellectuals, with quite a different background, is progressively emerging, at least in some countries which have engaged in the political and economic adjustment process. Even if it takes decades for the civil society as a whole to endorse a new social convention, the potential effects of such a shift in the behavior of elites, which can be far reaching, should not be discouraged, as a consequence of a lasting economic crisis.

Significant political changes have also taken place. After a long period of stability perpetuated by authoritarian single-party regimes, the last few years have seen the rise of democratic movements, demands for decentralization and greater autonomy of local governments. This shift is undoubtedly linked to the process of urbanization which implies the emergence of cities as economic and political powers competing among themselves and with the State, which must remain strong enough to arbitrate among diverging local interests.

Based on the long term retrospective, the study sketches a number of future scenarios. The long-term images which are presented illustrate the main themes mentioned earlier. Different settlement patterns give rise to the corresponding "images" of national economies and the regional economy that appear "compatible". This exercise is an opportunity to illustrate the interactions between population dynamics, the behavior of individuals and social groups, and economic change. These images provide plausible answers to the following questions for a few contrasted scenarios:

- Where will 400 million West Africans live a generation from now ?

- What will be the needs of the different categories of people in the different parts of the region? How and to what extent will those needs be met (what incomes, what activities, what trade)? What conditions must be met for the changes that are needed to come about ?

- What strategies, policies and investments are needed to make the process of population redistribution as efficient and sustainable as possible ? What obstacles and blockages need to be overcome ?

The ultimate hope is that the study will enable the decision makers in the region to become more acutely aware of the implications of long-term issues, and, as a result, that they will engage themselves in a real dialogue at the regional level and define with their partners from the international community a common plan of action based on the following fundamentals:

- the creation of an independent, African regional capacity for information and analysis of population dynamics and economic and social changes, which could perform an effective advisory role for the region's governments and regional institutions,

- the definition of an overall framework for infrastructure investment strategy that takes the requirements of the necessary population redistribution into account,

- the definition of macroeconomic and sectorial policies (including agricultural policies) that fully take the process of urbanization and its implications into account,

- the definition of strategies for exploiting the potential of regional markets, which have remained almost untapped so far.

WEST AFRICA LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY

REPORT OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

Brussels, January 17-19, 1994

March, 1994

SAH/CR(94)82

SUMMARY OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS

After its first meeting in November 1992 in Abidjan, the Scientific Committee of the West Africa Long Term Perspective Study (WALTPS) held its second meeting on January 17-19, 1994 in Brussels.

The meeting addressed five major topics:

- spatial dynamics;
- economic dynamics;
- socio-political dynamics;
- perspectives;
- implications.

The Committee acknowledged receipt of the working papers[1], and recognized the major progress made in the understanding of change in West Africa, past, present, and future. WALTPS had produced a number of innovative lines of research and a reliable database of spatialized data.

Following the recommendation of the first meeting, African researchers played an important part in Round 2, especially for the papers on political and social change and the case studies on Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria.

The Committee stressed that considerable work remained to be done, if the whole field of future perspectives was to be covered, since some areas of analysis had barely been touched. Summary reports of current work, particularly perspectives, must show the interrelation between various lines of research more clearly than had been done before.

The Committee encouraged the consultants to amend and finalize the working documents it had received. It further suggested that a number of summary reports be prepared:

- a summary report of some 80 pages presenting the state of knowledge so far achieved in WALTPS;

- a shorter report on the practical implications of WALTPS for policy-makers in governments and development agencies;

- a very brief executive summary for top-level policy-makers.

The study is due to be finished at a final meeting to be held most likely in June 1994 in Lagos. Before then, these summary reports will be forwarded to the members of the Committee for comment. Below can be found the main points of the presentations from the WALTPS team and remarks made by Committee members.

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[1] *Appendix 2 contains a list of working papers with summaries. Most are still in draft form.*

Opening remarks

The meeting of the Scientific Committee was opened by Mr. Jean Delorme, head of the West Africa Division of DG VIII, Mr. Roy Stacy, Director of the Club du Sahel Secretariat, and Mr. Mahamane Brah, Head of the Cinergie Unit of the ADB[2].

After briefly recalling the WALTPS process, the opening speakers set the aim of the meeting: to mark the change-over from Round 1, basically retrospective, to Round 2, devoted to perspectives and their translation into practical recommendations.

Following on from the 1990 World Bank perspective study, WALTPS is more than just a piece of research: its designers, organizers and funders have turned it into a process of discussion between a large number of partners and a multidisciplinary international team including Western and West African consultants.

WALTPS was designed to provide a regional framework for in-depth national perspective studies (NLTPS) and studies of subregions such as the Sahel, which is no longer to be seen as a set of semi-desert countries but rather as an integral part of the West African whole.

WALTPS has brought together for the first time a mass of data on population, production, and consumption for all of West Africa, and has organized these data within actual geographical limits by using a spatial information system (GIS). To add actual field data, case studies were carried out in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria. Initial results of the case studies were presented to the Brussels Committee meeting.

This second meeting really launches the perspective part of WALTPS. This is a difficult exercise, seeing the wood for the trees. There is no point in clinging to past trends. What is needed is the imagination to suggest a number of plausible images of West Africa's future.

Finally the agenda for the three days was outlined. There were first three **retrospective** sessions, devoted to **land occupation, the economy, and political and social change.**

Since settlement patterns had not changed greatly since the 1992 meeting, only the future developments in settlement analysis were presented.

The third day was entirely devoted to **perspective** discussion and an initial discussion of the **implications of WALTPS.**

In each retrospective session, case studies were used to complement the sectoral approach.

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[2] *Mr Brah's speech is contained in Appendix 4.*

I. SPATIAL DYNAMICS

The session began with two presentations: by Benoît Ninnin on the reasoning behind the spatial distribution of rural population, farm production and infrastructure, and by John Igué on the origin of national territories and their management by successive governments.

A. *PRESENTATIONS*

Benoît Ninnin had analyzed the great variability of rural areas by using an indicator called "market attractiveness", which roughly shows the extent to which a given rural area is connected to the region's urban markets[3]. Market attractiveness is used to establish whether trends in settlement patterns, population behavior and investment in road constructions can be partly explained by the sensitivity of farmers to market demand.

The size of towns and their net imports or exports are used to determine the final demand for each urban center. Data are incorporated on the infrastructure network, transport costs and farm production functions to produce the equilibrium price that generates a supply to meet the demand of each town[4]. This "spatialized" equilibrium makes it possible to calculate a "virtual" price for any point. The virtual equilibrium price is called market attractiveness, and is used to measure the economic opportunity of marketing to towns and thus, more generally, the extent to which rural areas are connected to the market. Market attractiveness indicators for each point in West Africa in 1960 and 1990 were calculated and correlated with three other variables which had been mapped from national statistics: rural population density, farm production and productivity, and density of road investment. The three variables correlate very closely with market attractiveness.

Rural population density increases with market attractiveness, and therefore with the proximity of towns. Conversely it is reduced by a factor of four as distance from major towns rises from 25 to 100 km. Analysis of various combinations of soil and climate, from very favorable to very adverse, reveals that in the worst conditions there is a threshold beyond which population density remains stable despite increasing market attractiveness. In more favorable areas this limit does not appear, and it is not clear at what rural population density production constraints would outweigh market attractiveness.

Farm productivity poses a different problem: the nearer farms are to the market, the greater the commercial opportunities; but production becomes physically more difficult because population density is higher (cf above). It is useful to study how rural productivity responds to these opposing forces. Analysis of spatialized farm production data reveals that the higher the market attractiveness (i.e. near towns), the greater the productivity per hectare and per farmer. The two main exceptions to the rule are cotton-growing areas, probably because

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[3] *See Benoît Ninnin's three working papers listed in Appendix 2, which explain in detail the ideas presented here.*

[4] *The analysis covered some 900 towns in West Africa of over 5,000 population.*

productivity benefits from an "infrastructure" effect, and coffee and cocoa growing areas in Côte d'Ivoire, because many migrants farm plots for food. Conversely, the northern part of the groundnut-growing area in Senegal and the Mossi highlands are less productive than the regional average.

Density of road investment is also correlated with market attractiveness. In other words, infrastructure building has responded to economic demand where it was most forcefully expressed. The only notable exception is Nigeria, which has used its oil revenues since the 1980s in a deliberate regional development policy, building roads to less populated areas least well connected to the market, such as the Middle Belt, with the aim of unifying the national territory.

John Igué dealt with the origins of West African national territories and the way they have been managed, mostly since independence, by governments[5]. This field observation intended to complement Benoît Ninnin's modeling approach.

To understand how national territories are managed, it is essential to understand the nature of these territories, and how they were formed. John Igué distinguishes the following types of reasoning in the formation of the colonial territories, which affect the functioning of the present-day States:

- military purposes: extensive, largely under-populated areas, basically in the Sahel;
- extraction: either mineral deposits, where infrastructure was limited to the mining sites, or farm lands, where infrastructure was designed to move produce towards the capital, which was also the focus for exports to the colonial homeland;
- trading posts: countries created mainly for trade purposes.

The colonial period saw the establishment of the basic spatial organization of States:

- cash crops planted (coffee, cocoa, groundnuts, cotton, etc.);
- urban network, expanded under colonial administration;
- road and rail networks, basically designed to extract and export the region's wealth.

Major infrastructure, such as communication axes and universities, often reflected regional thinking.

After independence, national thinking took over, with three main concerns: to control population and settlement patterns, to exploit natural wealth, and to integrate the new nation. Individual countries also had other, more local, concerns.

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[5] *See "States, borders and trends in land-use planning in West Africa" and "Trade and space in West Africa", listed in Appendix 2.*

Policy over the last thirty years may be summarized as follows:

- successive administrative reforms, intended more to ensure better political control than better public service. Some countries introduced up to five levels of administration with no significant improvement in efficiency;

- urban policy characterized by a top-heavy capital or competition between two main cities (as in Cameroon and Burkina Faso) rather than an overall policy for an urban network; infrastructure which still serves mainly to drain wealth towards the towns, especially capital cities;

- policies for schools and health care, with initially generous investment, now dilapidated for over ten years;

- projects for agricultural and industrial investment which have mostly failed;

- the abandonment of the West African regional dimension adopted during the colonial period (except for Nkrumah's achievements in Ghana). The regional university centers have been a failure.

There have not actually been any land use planning policies in the sense of policy to even out regional disparities within a country. There has been rather an infrastructure policy, responding to demand when possible and where the demand is strongest. Nothing has been done to balance relations between town and country, and urban areas have developed without any structuring effect on the territory. Similarly, mining areas have not really polarized land use. New poles of development have not necessarily arisen from State land use planning policies, but rather from local factors, such as towns, rich farming areas, markets, and borders.

Land use planning policy has suffered from severe conceptual faults: no overall national vision of the territory, and no idea of a "local area", in the sense of a coherent planning unit, since this was suppressed by tribalism and the fear that it might threaten national unity. Since most States can no longer afford a deliberate land use planning policy, it is probably coherent "local areas" that should be the focus of territorial management in the future.

B. DISCUSSION

Benoît Ninnin and John Igué's work was generally well received by the Committee.

It was widely agreed that land use planning had been limited to building infrastructure at the demand of economic players. Land use planning was a political failure; it had not reduced or managed disparities, causing local demands for border changes.

There were some questions about the market attractiveness method. The author extended his answers in an evening session devoted to methodological matters and convinced members of the validity of the reasoning. He recommended that modeling should be validated by ground data.

Discussion centered largely on **migration,** under a number of headings:

Migration and urban changes

Luc-Normand Tellier's work on urban systems reveals that the center of gravity of the West African urban system has shifted slightly to the east over the last thirty years. Migration tends to develop cities in the coastal countries faster than those in the Sahel, and increased urbanization in the coastal countries has shifted inland.

Generally speaking, the urban system in south-west Nigeria seems to have a lasting effect in influencing the entire network of West African cities.

Factors behind migration

Are migrants forced out of their native areas or attracted towards new lives? What are the factors behind their decisions?

The Ghana case study stresses the importance of economic opportunity (jobs) in migration. Migration between rural areas is greater than from country to town.

In Nigeria, migrants were for many years attracted by the areas of development of the colonial economy (cocoa and rubber in the south-west, palm oil in the south-east, groundnuts and cotton in the north). Urbanization did not occur around a single pole. The creation of new federal states encouraged the development of towns. At present, migrants are attracted by formal and informal jobs to be found in the 593 administrative centers of the Federation. The largest cities continue to grow. In the highly populated south-east, areas of continuous settlement are appearing where the division between town and country is losing its meaning[6].

The Mali case study also shows that migration has been affected by the economic crisis of the 1980s, which hit cities more than villages.

The population of Mali settled in the area between the great rivers at the time of the pre-colonial empires. During the colonial period it shifted to the west. After independence, a combination of dirigiste policies and droughts brought about a major change in settlement patterns, focussing now on the Bamako-Koutiala-Ségou triangle, where the country's main wealth is to be found. There has also been considerable emigration, and one-quarter of people born in Mali now live outside the country, providing one-quarter of its hard currency income.

The economic crisis of the 1980s caused a number of changes. Migrants returned to rural areas, encouraged by plentiful rainfall. Sometimes they returned only for part of the year. This example, paralleled elsewhere, shows that the origin of income must be treated with great caution, since it may come from many sources for a given individual. The crisis

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[6] *See the report of the workshop held in November 1993 in Lagos on "Population, space and development in Nigeria".*

appeared also to cause a slowdown in the growth of Bamako (12 to 4%) in favor of secondary towns (8%). The smallest towns are growing slowly (4%).

Analysis of economic factors behind migration should concentrate on the consequences of the devaluation of the CFA franc, which should favor rural incomes.

Migration and the environment

Committee members pointed out the link between migration and the degradation of natural resources. West Africa has long been marked by the advance of the Sahara. As the desert has advanced, so people have moved.

River systems have also played an important part in settlement patterns. It is surprising that land use planning policies have ignored river catchment areas. Fouta Djallon was also mentioned; it has gradually lost what was once a dense population, and now seems threatened with ecological destruction, although it is the water tower of West Africa. This is an important issue for the future.

In arable areas, extensive farming has reached its limits. Soils are being exhausted. Conflicts are increasing, especially in Nigeria and Mali, making the cooperative management of land a matter of urgency.

In Mali, the elimination of river blindness is opening up new land in the west. The most productive farm lands, the cotton area and Office du Niger, have seen an increase in the numbers of people and cattle. In southern Mali, farming is being intensified, with land being enclosed and fallow land reduced, leading to competition for natural resources.

In short, the occupation of land is determined by structural trends and the action of governments, which attempt to manage fragile balances within a given area. Where the two meet, there is room for deliberate policy-making. But this has been lacking up to now, and settlement patterns have rather followed long-term trends cyclically affected by market changes, obviously the case with the population of Mali, which has long been extremely mobile.

II. ECONOMY

The research on the economy was introduced by presentations from David Naudet and Jean-Marie Cour, complemented by case studies on Burkina Faso and Ghana by Edmond Kaboré and M. Sowa.

A. *PRESENTATIONS*

David Naudet presented an initial interpretation of trends over the last thirty years in West Africa[7].

"Extensive" growth

Over the last thirty years, West Africa has seen "extensive" economic growth of 3% a year, close to that of the population. The crisis of the 1980s caused a fall in urban productivity and stagnation in rural productivity. However, per capita GDP has remained virtually stable over thirty years (up 10%). The factors of production, including labor, have increased considerably with no gain in productivity. For example, in farming, calorie production has risen at an average rate of 2%, compared with 1.85% for rural population growth. This is also true in other sectors.

West Africa has seen considerable population mobility. Economic growth has rather shifted population towards more productive areas than increased per capita growth in those areas. Mobility may even have exceeded the real demand from the economy: Burkinabès, for example, moved into Côte d'Ivoire, but per capita growth in Burkina was faster than in Côte d'Ivoire.

Cities have absorbed a large number of people, but economic activity has not developed as fast as the supply of labor: this economic failure is clearly related to the crisis in the modern sector, and more generally in formal or informal transformation activity. Only those activities have developed that are protected by a natural advantage, such as oil refining and timber, or by a geographical one, such as breweries and bakeries. The vigor of the protected activities contrasts with the collapse of the unprotected ones, such as textiles, confectionery and cement.

Growth based on overseas trade

Revenues from overseas trade have been the main engine for long-term growth in West Africa. This covers trade in goods, particularly commodities, and also public and private transfers and capital flows, particularly debt.

By comparison, internal and intraregional trade is slight.

This engine for growth has been supported by very efficient mechanisms of redistribution. In the 1960s and 1970s, redistribution was achieved by public expenditure from levies on overseas trade and by the circulation of people and incomes.

When the recession of the 1980s arrived, there was a rapid growth in circulation activities aimed at moving income around rather than creating products. This type of activity appears to be a large proportion of the informal sector, up to 80% of informal jobs according to surveys in Cameroon.

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[7] *See "Economic prospects for West Africa in the decade ahead", available in English.*

Obstacles to change

This extensive growth persists because of obstacles to change, of which the three main ones are as follows:

- Rent-seeking rather than competition: in overseas and internal trade, a rigid legal framework discourages enterprise. Economic rents operate to the disadvantage of competition and lead nowhere.

- Circulation rather than production: there is a sort of symbiosis between the trading class and the State. "Cut-price sales" of second-rate imported goods are also invading West Africa.

- The distant rather than the local. Politicians are more concerned with overseas trade than with West African integration. The region appears to be destructured, dependent on policy and currency distortions, smuggling and fraud.

World and regional trends

World trends towards polarization on the Pacific Rim, increased globalization, competition in capital markets, and stagnant commodity prices may threaten the continuation of present trends in West Africa. Traditional overseas trade is likely to decline, at least per capita.

West Africa has also lost its strategic trump card now that the Cold War is over. Development aid is likely to remain stagnant.

Apart from changing settlement patterns, described elsewhere, West Africa is characterized by four major trends.

Future food import needs remain uncertain. Increased food dependency is not to be seen as a long-term trend, since it has reduced in recent years. Dependency depends on the products. Those that enjoy natural protection because they do not travel well, such as poultry, market garden produce, pigs and goats, have greatly expanded. Semi-protected products specific to African markets, such as legumes and tubers, have expanded to meet demand. However, products subject to direct competition, such as cereals, beef, and milk, are losing market share to overseas imports. Managing relations with external markets is, therefore, a crucial factor for the future.

Integration in world trade remains slow, and based on commodities. Diversification of exports can only be a long process. There are at present no moves in this direction. Furthermore, a strategy of international competitiveness does not only involve cost reduction. It also requires structural changes which take time, such as an enterprise culture, the development of human resources, the separation of market and State, and the development of financial markets.

Traditional trade is losing momentum, but there is considerable potential in harmful activities such as the production and sale of drugs.

Pockets of intensification are appearing in some sectors. For intensification to occur requires four factors: learning, economic incentives (market), constraints (e.g. land), and competition. These factors are beginning to emerge in parts of farming, the informal sector (with improved services), and locally in industry, as perhaps in the Ibo lands. However the macro-economic effect has yet to be seen.

A multilateral debt crisis may also be expected.

Donors are tending on the one hand to treat Africa as a special case, and on the other to regionalize their aid programs.

To complement David Naudet's analysis, Jean-Marie Cour proposed a second retrospective interpretation of West African economies[8]. This interpretation is called demo-economic, and starts from the analysis of life styles, particularly household income and budget structure, by place of residence (capital, provincial city, village) and type of activity (farm, informal, modern) to produce an image of the economy. This image is no more accurate than the one given by national accounts. But the one complements the other, providing a "stereoscopic" view of the whole region.

The demo-economic approach is particularly suited to West Africa, since the region's major problem is indeed to absorb a population explosion and connect with the world economy. Africa is the last part of the world to make this transition.

West African economies are complex, which is how they have managed to stand up to the incredible pressures and shocks of the last thirty years. Demo-economic analysis gives a glimpse of this complexity, providing a new estimate of the diversity of movement between town and country and putting an economy in a regional context.

The demo-economic interpretation is a counter to the pessimism aroused by the examination of the fundamentals used in standard economic analysis. It reveals West Africa's positive achievements, such as investment in real estate, a thriving informal sector providing many jobs, and human concentration leading ultimately to solvent markets.

The main conclusions from the WALTPS demo-economic analysis are as follows:

- Farm productivity is slowly improving. Farmers are working increasingly for the regional market, which now takes nearly 85% of farm value added. There appear to be two thresholds: with urban population below 20%, production suffers from erratic movements of too small a food market; from 20 to 50%, surpluses can be planned; and above 50%, food crops operate like cash crops.

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8 *See "Retrospective demo-economic analysis and suggested long-term demo-economic picture of West Africa" and "Farm performance and population redistribution in West Africa", available in English.*

- Informal sector productivity is stagnant, but the numbers of people involved have risen tenfold in thirty years. This is the sector of choice to absorb migrants from poorer areas. It takes them in and in various ways forces them to integrate into the urban world.

- The modern sector represented the same share of GDP in 1960 and 1990, with a high point in 1980. It is in deep crisis and is no longer an engine for economic growth.

From 1960 to 1990 economic activity gradually concentrated spatially. West Africa has a very low average economic intensity per unit area. Densification is needed to bring producers and customers together: the GDP of an average West African country is that of a European city of 100,000 population. Concentration of population, with, therefore, greater disparities between areas, is probably the price to pay for lower per capita disparities.

In 1960-90, a vast amount of real estate was accumulated. The equivalent of 20% of regional GDP seems to have gone into this area. This is a massive investment, especially since the initial base was so low: the number of town-dwellers has increased sevenfold in thirty years, from 13 to 85 million. This capital formation occurs largely informally and is poorly recorded in official accounts, leading to a gross understatement of the rate of investment in the region.

There was a sharp change in trends in 1980. The macro-economic situation in 1990 remained very difficult. Net transfers became nil, as a result of large debt repayments. Export earnings fell despite volume increases, as commodity prices collapsed. Internal migration has stopped or even, perhaps, reversed, showing that urbanization is primarily determined by economic factors.

In general, the economies operate at two levels. First there is the basic economy meeting the population's essential needs, which vary according to place and life-style: food, housing, clothes, transport. This economy is resilient and largely informal, and its trends are relatively predictable. The second level is more directly linked to the modern economy and exposed to fluctuations in world markets. This is the level that may be expected to change fastest, but it is less likely to be able to resist external shocks.

The "economic" session was an occasion to present the preliminary results of the Burkina Faso and Ghana case studies.

The Burkina Faso case study made a start at spatializing economic statistics by region and also habitat. In 1990, 52% of national value added appeared to come from urban areas, which contained 13% of the population, using a national criterion to define urban, which differs from the WALTPS one.

This estimate of economic flows can be used to assess variations in average productivity between regions, habitats and sectors. The ratio of average productivity between rural and urban areas is 1 to 6, and 1 to 4 between rural areas and the urban informal sector.

Economic performance was also spatialized by a factor analysis of Burkina's ten planning regions, described by thirty socio-economic variables. This made it possible to divide the territory into groups of regions.

The Center, for example, has a satisfactory level of development but with limited farm performance, and strong pressure on land. The West, with Boucle du Monhoun, appears to be both agricultural and dynamic. One purpose of the analysis is to reveal those regions with poorer infrastructure than their potential would suggest, such as the South-west and the East; these regions could be poles of expansion in the future.

The Ghana case study used the accounting framework suggested in the WALTPS report and the results of the draft Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Ghana which the consultants were given as an illustration of the method proposed. Unfortunately the consultants did not have access to the results of parts 2 and 3 of the Ghana Living Standards Surveys, although these had been processed many months before. The only bases for macro-economic and socio-economic data used were international handbooks, which reduces the depth of analysis compared with WALTPS. The consultants note that farming is the only sector whose share of total employment has increased, from 57% in 1970 to 61% in 1984, then, after the economic recovery program, to 66% in 1987, although it is the sector with slowest economic growth. This is apparently because farming was a refuge for people who had lost their jobs in the public and service sectors as a result of structural adjustment.

On regional integration the consultants present a well-researched historical analysis of Ghana's foreign policy and the views of successive governments on regional integration and cooperation with Ghana's neighbors. Analysis of overseas and intraregional trade, unfortunately based on official statistics in the absence of other sources, shows how weak intraregional trade is. The reasons are that Ghana has not had in the past, and does not seem to have in the immediate future, any great advantage in developing trade with its neighbors, especially if it were to be to the detriment of overseas trade. However, a cost-benefit analysis shows that Ghana could benefit from greater intraregional trade if current institutional weaknesses (ECOWAS) are overcome, regional growth recovers, and the obstacle of an overvalued CFA franc is removed (as it recently has been). Ghana's main regional competitor appears to be Côte d'Ivoire, but Ghana has comparative advantages for a number of products for the regional market, such as cola, salt, and aluminum products.

B. DISCUSSION

The Committee's discussion confirmed their interest in the experimental "demo-economic" method.

Some participants pointed out that this research provided a great deal of information. Demo-economic analysis pays due attention to the fact that the economy is driven by people's motivations. Further work should be done to escape from the useless straitjacket of national accounting. The following suggestions were made:

- greater attention should be paid to intersectoral connections, unrecorded transfers to and from overseas, and the respective role of overseas and intraregional trade;

- greater explanation should be given of the data used to assess the behavior of various types of household and the generalizations drawn from them;

- the working hypotheses should be formulated more carefully: demo-economic analysis is based on saying, with Galileo, " But it does move," the hypothesis that West Africa overall copes with its imbalances. But, as one member pointed out, "It is not certain that the functioning of the State will make it possible to manage imbalances."

However, most of the discussion addressed the content. Where are these trends leading? Are they accurate? Are they compatible?

Where are current trends leading?

Some speakers were skeptical about the hypotheses underlying the demo-economic analysis.

Some were still worried by urban trends. Are these trends the way forward? How is urban poverty to be coped with? How long will this "survival" period have to last, dominated by the informal economy? The demo-economic analysis proposed, it was felt, offered no alternative: our fate is sealed, migration and settlement will continue, and West Africa will absorb the shocks. Will not such a passive survival strategy be an obstacle to progress?

The trends outlined in David Naudet's presentation, on the other hand, were felt to be too unfavorable, since they were based on recent years of crisis in the CFA countries, while they adopted deflationary adjustment policies without devaluation.

If these criticisms are considered positively, the two analyses are complementary:

- one points to historical trends: meeting basic needs, gradual urbanization. This is a "historical" way forward for West Africa, as followed by other parts of the world. This analysis stresses society's resilience;

- the other concentrates on current trends, the inertia of social structures, the pressures from the rest of the world.

It would be absurd to believe that the historical path is never strayed from, but it is always returned to in the end. That may be the lesson to be drawn. It is important to avoid both reliance on automatic patterns and excessive pessimism. Neither attitude is a good preparation for action.

This discussion on the economy raised once again the question asked on the first day: are people driven by rural poverty into towns, where they huddle in squalor, or are they attracted by the bright lights of a better future? Is the answer the same for big cities and minor towns?

Speakers stressed yet again the extreme features of present-day Africa: half the population is under fifteen, nearly half lives in towns, and many people are migrants.

The discussion on the economy confirmed that urban questions, migration and political and social variables are at the heart of West African perspectives.

III. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE

A. *PRESENTATIONS*

Mamadou Diouf presented the report on research into political and social change[9].

In the days before colonization, power depended on the control of people rather than land. This power was sometimes exercised over wide, multi-ethnic communities.

The colonial period brought profound social changes, a compromise between the existing system and that imported by the colonizers. The colonial authorities settled disputes and administered the politics of their territories by alliances between ethnic groups.

- local tribal chiefs were brought into the administration and thus lost much of their credit;
- towns had their role redefined, and others were built from scratch: they served mostly as relays for exports, and were always run by minorities (the term *évolués* was used for these urban Africans);
- the function of the West African colonies in producing raw materials, especially farm commodities, determined a number of political choices: for example, migration was organized from one rural area to another to provide labor for cash crops (Mali-Senegal, Burkina-Côte d'Ivoire, etc.)

From the 1930s a new social group emerged, those urban workers called *détribalisés*, because they did not answer to any of the customary leaders but had not joined the *évolués* in adopting the colonial culture.

Independence was demanded by mixed coalitions based on the urban minority, and was eventually achieved in 1958-60. It was founded on two simple ideas: nation-states could be formed in West Africa, and the colonial borders could be used for them. Beyond that, the independence movement was carried forward by a boundless optimism: independence would make everything possible -- democracy, economic growth, and so on.

In fact, the newly independent States inherited inefficient territories which were anything but national communities. In the desire to affirm the cohesion of the nation-state, a modern ideology was adopted of a single State over the individual citizen, as opposed to diversity, especially ethnic, which was assumed to be an obstacle to development; the State intervened extensively in the economy.

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[9] *This research began later than the rest, and took the form of three workshops: trends in Nigeria (seen as major determining factors in regional trends); trends in cities; and trends in governance and institutions. See "Social change in West Africa: audit and prospects", "A new shape for the democratic African State", and various draft papers written for the Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Nigeria case studies listed in Appendix 2.*

Soon the State had monopolized the workings of formal society. Wealth became a function of political power, producing a State bourgeoisie. This wealth was handed down within a restricted clan, or even a single family. As early as 1962-63 power became personalized. Most social groups were shut out of the process, leading to disorganization in society and an ever narrower power-base for the regimes.

As long as resources were relatively plentiful, the weakness of the link between the State and society did not prevent a trade-off with some benefits for both sides. The mismatch between real society and the State became more obvious and more serious as structural adjustment was adopted, leading to the rejection of the powers that be and culminating in democratic reform.

But these democratic reforms are only constitutional and do not profoundly affect the nature of power or solve the problem of the disinvolvement of the majority. In every recent election, where only a minority could vote anyway, since more than half the population is under age, voter turnout was between 25 and 35%.

This crisis has opened a breach between the authorities and "civil" society. The modern elites living off the independent State are increasingly contested by the traditional elites. These are in general not the customary elites, but rather players such as marabouts and local traders, who came to the fore in the early colonial period, were marginalized in the decades after independence, and are now re-emerging as a result of economic and constitutional crisis. Privatization and the end of monopoly are giving these groups a strong economic base. But as yet there is no institutional means for representing them.

It had been thought that the city, assumed to be a center of modern life, was a factor for openness to the world and national integration. It can now be seen that in time of crisis people are retreating into their identities, whether religious, ethnic or regional, and are organizing round them. These are the networks that support the informal economy, receive new migrants, and are able to mobilize efforts for forward-looking projects.

National citizenship in a "constitutional" sense is being questioned along with the State, in favor of a political and cultural citizenship covering different areas. In many cases, only the army is a really national force.

These processes show that new political and social patterns are emerging that are the beginnings of an African political modernity. Although outside models remain strong, this is probably the end of the post-colonial State shaped by men and organizational patterns from colonial government. The vast majority of West Africans have been born since independence and no longer identify with the founding myth that these States have a national destiny. When resources are scarce, Africans demand more of their elites.

This modernity is not without risk. Far from being cosmopolitan, as might have been assumed, it is shaped by a marked return to local identities, sometimes with increased intolerance and violence. One of the major issues for the future of West Africa is how to create a new sense of citizenship benefiting from the cohesion of group identity without excluding others.

B. DISCUSSION

The discussion following Mamadou Diouf's presentation addressed first the crisis of the State, and then the urban phenomenon and relations between town and country.

The crisis of the State

The participants all supported Mamadou Diouf's observation: the State is in a profound crisis, which takes various forms. Crucial service and control functions are increasingly ineffective, such as education, natural resource management, public safety. Economically, the State is withdrawing from production, but the basic rules of the economy remain badly designed and unenforced, as is shown by the size of the informal sector. Property law is not established. Essential rules for the operation of markets are not enforced (transparency, competition, free circulation).

The idea of citizenship is in question. People will not vote (turnout below 30%). The final nationalist constituency is the army.

Ethnicity is returning in force because citizens' rights are not respected, either in their own country or outside it. This risk is threatening integration, as emigrants send their savings back to their home country.

Many Africans are not full citizens of the places where they live. Malian emigrants (2-4 million) and Guineans (over 700,000) cannot vote in their own countries. Within Nigeria, the constitution itself is an obstacle to naturalization: individuals have to prove local roots to enjoy full rights in the federal state where they live.

The region as a whole is extensively Balkanized: 16 states in West Africa, with 30 ministers per state. Regional institutions are not working. How can this continue?

What is behind the crisis?

The participants advanced two problems: identification and resources.

Citizens' identification with the State is at the heart of the present crisis. People do not identify with institutions that are mostly the result of the colonial period. These institutions meet the needs of the urban elites, not those of the majority, in rural areas and the informal sector.

The financing of the State is also in crisis. Taxes on foreign trade are reaching their limit. Local taxation is declining, as is shown by the fall in tax receipts in Mali.

Who is the State? Increasingly the answer is informal and confused. Who is responsible?

How can the crisis be dealt with?

Committee members then considered various answers:

- The idea of decentralization was raised a number of times. Local communities could take on service or control functions still in the public domain, such as education or natural resource management. This type of decentralization would require tax reform.

Decentralization returns power to the grassroots. Since peoples have been split by borders and migrants from some countries are dispersed outside them, decentralization could play a favorable part in regional integration. Border communities could negotiate more easily with others across the border than central States can with each other.

- Privatization of productive activities controlled by the State is another answer. But for private enterprise to operate, rules must guarantee property rights and facilitate trade.

Some participants raised the pros and cons of decentralization and privatization. Is it proven that decentralization increases the amount of democracy? Does less State mean less profiteering? On property rights, caution is called for: for example, should a land tenure system be chosen that provides greatest economic efficiency, or that enjoys the greatest consensus?

The central State remains essential, for example, to protect minorities. There is a danger that public life be reduced to ethnic confrontation. The new forms of democracy will have to take the ethnic factor into account.

Finally discussion came back to the central question of re-constructing institutions. How is it to be done? How can people invent a new State for themselves? The process is occurring, even if the present leaders have not yet admitted their failure.

It would be useful to examine how societies seek new identities. How can conflicts be avoided between new types of identification -- ethnic groups, nationalities, churches, sects, local organizations? Work needs to be done on the forms of democracy, the various ways of making public choices.

A process of this sort is not to be steered from outside. External partners should, therefore, show restraint in their intervention in the organization of civil society. More than anything else, the reconstruction of institutions is the business of local people. The emergence of local organizations or NGOs should be covered more extensively in WALTPS.

The relations of towns with the rural world were mentioned once more, based on the Nigerian and Mali case studies above.

IV. PERSPECTIVES

The final morning was devoted to recapitulating the sectoral research in terms of future prospects. Five presentations explored the future along the various lines of WALTPS: demography, distribution of population and activity, long-term demo-economic picture, ten-year economic scenarios, and perspectives of social and political change.

A. *PRESENTATIONS*

Demographic perspective

Benoît Kalasa explained why WALTPS had made its own demographic projections when there are others available from numerous official sources. Simply because the other projections all assume migration as zero or tending rapidly towards zero, which contradicts past experience in the region and will likely be false in the future.

Overall future population figures for West Africa adopted by WALTPS correspond to a low hypothesis among those generally given. They assume a rapid fall in fecundity, although there is as yet no early sign of this. The WALTPS projection takes 430 million as a realistic hypothesis. By way of comparison, the World Bank hypothesis is 520 million for the same date, and the upper UN hypothesis is 560 million.

Growth in the urban population slows, from roughly 6% in 1960-90 to 4.2% in 1990-2020. It rises from 85 to 271 million (235 is the lower estimate, 300 the higher).

Data on Aids are few, as are any assessments of its medium-term demographic consequences. HIV infection rates in West Africa seem to be below 3% of the population, except for the Central African Republic. The demographic consequences are uncertain: even at these low rates, the demographic shortfall (deaths plus loss of births) could reach 13 million. At higher rates of infection (15%) the shortfall could be 60 million. Two main points can be made about these figures: even with Aids, the population is likely to go on growing fast; and Aids is likely to have a disastrous impact on societies both in health care costs and by affecting the most dynamic groups in the population -- young people and town-dwellers.

Future settlement patterns

Benoît Ninnin showed that taking a given distribution of urban population in West Africa based on hypotheses on the network of main towns, it is possible to project changes in market attractiveness and the advantages of settling various rural areas. From the difference between evenly spread rural population growth and the "optimal" distribution produced by the model, an initial picture can be formed of which areas will be more populated, and which will be "relatively" under-populated and could take in migration. This initial picture is being completed, and will then be compared with other approaches to give an idea of the ecological, economic, social and political modifications that might affect the equilibrium observed in the past or the ability of regions to manage the migration caused by disequilibrium.

Long-term picture

Jean-Marie Cour used the demo-economic matrix presented earlier to outline the likely features of a West Africa with more than 400 million population, according to three scenarios of urban population: medium (270 million), low (235 million) and high (300 million). It is assumed that West Africa will gradually move towards the world pattern of behavior for equivalent population and living standards. Regional trade develops considerably, farm productivity rises quickly but only among a minority of farmers, the modern sector gradually recovers growth, complemented by an informal sector that becomes a structured

"intermediate" sector. A class of farming and urban entrepreneurs emerges, laying the bases for true economic decentralization. Nigeria leads these trends: its average farm productivity is higher and its industry is gradually being structured.

In general, the long-term picture makes it possible to understand trends and foresee crises and peaks in those trends. For example, the crisis of rapid urban growth was predictable, but it has passed its peak and future developments should be more normal.

Ten-year scenarios

After his presentation of past economic trends in West Africa, David Naudet proposed three scenarios for the medium-term future.

The **first scenario** is an extension of past trends: **overseas trade and economic rent.**

Overseas trade continues to be the main and often only engine for growth. There is high mobility of population and continued rapid urbanization. The big cities produce a consumer constituency which, allied to the dominant trading classes, encourages the import of sub-standard and subsidized goods, and world surpluses. Production is restricted to the exporting sectors (commodities), protected sectors and subsistence farming. Dependency in food and manufactured consumer goods increases, leading inevitably to shortages caused by lack of foreign currency.

Winners: Nigeria with its solid oil revenues, and the trading bourgeoisie which takes over power. Losers: the landlocked Sahel, which returns to a subsistence economy, Cameroon and Niger, as their natural resources are exhausted. A major risk: the development of illicit economic rents (drugs).

The **second scenario** assumes increasing economic differentiation with the **emergence of poles and peripheries.**

Those countries with the highest development potential adopt long-term adjustment policies with the support of the international community with a view to developing competitive products, especially farm commodities, for the world market.

Production generally develops only slowly in unprotected activities, despite active monetary policies. Support from the international community enables cities to maintain an acceptable level of activity. Services, especially social services, improve as the State is reformed. In the peripheries the situation is like that in the first scenario, except for Mali and Burkina Faso, which have products to trade. The inequality between poles and peripheries increases, leading to tensions in migration, trade and currencies.

The main winners are the new poles. The "ideal" country in this scenario is one which gives priority to agriculture, separates market and State, and develops an African form of governance, while maintaining a close partnership with the international community. Ghana is the best example, but it could be Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal or Cameroon. Nigeria's oil revenues give that country greater room for maneuver.

The **third scenario** is an ambitious one: it involves the **creation of a wide regional bloc,** based on the development of local production and intraregional trade.

However, it implies a ten-year transition period that is difficult if not problematic, because

- regional policy harmonization would in the short term severely reduce intraregional trade, which is at present based on distortions;

- there would be no improvement in the standard of living, as consumers would have restricted access to imports. Furthermore, the decline in trading would affect incomes.

- substituting regional goods for imports would be very tricky, because of price and quality;

- reconverting entrepot States and ensuring the survival of unproductive States would be painful problems.

Economic and social trends

Mamadou Diouf concluded the presentations by addressing political and social matters. Perspectives in this area are obviously risky, since the phenomena are changing rapidly. He restricted himself to asking a few questions:

All that can be safely said is that there is likely to be considerable social and political instability as social movements and changes accelerate.

There are, roughly speaking, two possible outcomes for present trends:

- "Back to the 19th century." This refers to the period when the abolition of the slave trade removed West Africa's major source of wealth and it had to reorganize in depth around a few trading posts. This is the first alternative, which in the past has led to considerable violence.

- The invention of an African modernity. This is happening day by day. It has positive aspects, like the increasing ability to organize locally, but contains real dangers, such as the growing xenophobia to be seen throughout West Africa.

In either case the institutions will have to change. Clearly we have reached the end of the post-colonial period, and are entering the phase of the African state. Societies will have to reconcile themselves with their neighbors and their own history. The State must redefine itself, probably from the bottom up, starting with the aspirations of local communities. But what will be the territories for these reformed States? Is there any real future for the present borders? Where will new territorial divisions emerge? What will they be based on: economic, cultural or other ties?

And lastly, among all the competing interests within West Africa, who are the players most determined to support a truly regional objective?

B. DISCUSSION

These presentations provoked many comments and suggestions.

Complementary approaches

The first comment pointed out the diversity and complementarity of the various perspective approaches.

- The research into population distribution provides evidence of the structuring effect of towns on rural areas. The projections are helpful. It would be useful to research into the urban network itself, since, in the model proposed, it determines settlement patterns. Indeed a fourth scenario could be suggested of "polarization of poles", covering relations between cities according to their size, function, etc.

- The research on the social accounting matrix could be used to examine options, and compare scenarios in terms of the most controllable variables or the most predictable crises. This remains to be done.

- The research into economic policies has the advantage of describing possibilities, as a function of key variables such as the interface between national and world markets (especially currency issues and regional integration), the political choices of States, and the attitude of the international community. Currency issues should be more closely examined, especially the effect of monetary stability or devaluation on the relations between Franc Zone countries and their neighbors. Now that the CFA franc has been devalued, will it be easier to study the prospects of regional integration and examine the pros and cons of opening up to world markets or greater protection?

- The research on political and social prospects reveals various players, such as traders who might become entrepreneurs, civil servants who are now mostly teachers and soldiers, traditional oligarchies, new rural organizations. The question might be asked, "Who is the State?"

The diversity of the methods must be accepted. They are creative without being exhaustive. There are some gaps, such as "what will the towns produce?" A number of participants suggested filling these gaps if possible by the end of WALTPS, or shortly afterwards.

Three sources of imbalance: technology, the environment, and social change

Technology

For each farmer to feed a growing number of mouths, there need to be technical changes in production systems, food processing, and new types of energy for agriculture. It would be useful to have a better understanding of the interaction between policies, institutions and technological innovations. The best-known example, the green revolution, occurred in a quite different context, with stable States and stable pro-farming economic policies.

The environment

The settlement model takes account of the capacity of soils. But more questions need to be asked about settlement and the exploitation of natural resources in savanna areas.

Are not technology and natural resources appropriate areas for outside investment?

Social change, the State

The introduction of political and social variables is the most delicate part of WALTPS, first because the research started later, but mainly because they are extremely complex. They raise the whole question of institutions, as well as migration, land use planning, and relations with the rest of the world.

Some participants stressed the importance of education and training, which are basic investments in the future. This area could be examined more closely in the national perspective studies.

Altogether, the participants expressed the wish that WALTPS be extended, with more ramifications. In the short term, they suggested that the perspective part of the study be dealt with interactively, by running various options through the scenarios to see the effects of a given shock or a given policy.

V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF WALTPS

The final session of the meeting was devoted to an initial discussion of possible implications of WALTPS.

Continuation and use of perspective research

It is desirable that the perspective research, its results and methods, should be widely circulated, especially to other researchers. WALTPS should also be translated into its implications for policy-makers in West Africa.

Although the approach is a complex one, it could be invaluable at a national level, with a view to both national and regional integration. Within a given country, spatialization and demo-economic analysis could be useful methods. The regional issues need also to be tested country by country. This could be a task for national units to promote regional cooperation.

The participants asked that the perspective research be continued in various countries. Such research would be useful for administrations (for example, planning ministries) and private operators. Each society could in this way have a vision of its own future, which it could then modify.

National strategy on world markets and the region

The discussion raised the importance of regional cooperation. There are many reasons for its failure: the absence of regional lobbies, the ineffectiveness of regional organizations, low motivation in the States, etc. Are West African countries going to continue to deal separately

with the world market? Are they going to continue to ignore the advantages of cooperation, such as export markets, technology transfer, and investment?

Particular efforts should be made to bring English- and French-speaking countries together. Should these countries not be seeking to attract investment from Nigeria?

The Club du Sahel is invited to intensify its work in these areas, especially with Nigeria and ECOWAS. The Nigerian Institute for International Affairs proposes a voluntary contribution on the role of Nigeria in the region.

The role of partners from outside the region

Outside partners probably have greater latitude than West African States in devoting resources to long-term and regional investment.

They could, for example, put more into communications and urban infrastructure. For this it would be useful to cross sector boundaries and take account, say, of the interaction between town and country.

The partners could also support the development of local ability in studying the region: geography, settlement patterns, economics, etc.

Crisis anticipation

The final implication was that the WALTPS process should increase the capability to forecast and manage crises, especially in migratcion, with all the problems it causes, or in the prevention of major epidemics like AIDS.

CONCLUSION

The Scientific Committee entrusted the leaders of the WALTPS process with a number of tasks.

In research terms, the various sectoral papers should be amended in the light of remarks by Committee members and published in definitive form.

The team should also produce a complete but succinct report (some 75 pages) summarizing the research. The report would include the work of the sectoral teams and the case studies. The "perspective" part should present the major issues and options, particularly in terms of predictable shocks and decisions that governments might take. The devaluation of the CFA franc is one example of a decision that is important for the region's future. A draft of the report would be sent to the members of the Committee.

A specific analysis of the implications of WALTPS should be prepared, with a 15-page summary of the results for policy-makers.

The research should continue to be widely circulated and digested, to repair one of Africa's failings: the absence of long-term vision. The generation past had its vision of independence and the building of a modern State. What visions do the policy-makers and leaders of today have? The WALTPS process should help them create new ones.

Appendix 1

PARTICIPANTS AT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE

Boubacar Barry, CRDI, Dakar, Senegal
Oti Boateng, Government statistician, Statistical Service, Accra, Ghana
Bernard Caisso, Policy Unit, DG VIII, Commission of the European Communities
Josué Dione, INSAH/CERPOD, Bamako, Mali
Gilles Fontaine, Policy Unit, DG VIII, Commission of the European Communities
Michel Griffon, CIFAD, Paris, France
Adekbayo Olukushi, Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Nigeria
Adrian Otten, World Bank, technical department for Africa
Luc-Normand Tellier, University of Québec, Montréal, Canada
Ibrahim Tiémogo, Faculty of Agronomy, Niamey, Niger
Wouter Tims, Centre for World Food Studies, Free University, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Richard Westebbe, consultant to the World Bank, French-speaking coastal Africa, Washington

Unable to attend:

José Brito, UNDP/NLTPS, Abidjan
Mamadou Koulibaly, University of Abidjan, Abidjan
Thomas Reardon, Michigan State University, U.S.

Cinergie Unit

Mahamane Brah, Unit director
Chérif Seye

Club du Sahel Secretariat

Roy A. Stacy, Director of the Secretariat
Jean-Marie Cour
Jean-Marc Pradelle
Carol Voyer
Serge Snrech

WALTPS consultants

Moustapha Dème (Mali case study)
Mamadou Diouf (coordination of research into social and political change)
John Igué (land use planning)
Edmond Kaboré (Burkina Faso case study)
Benoît Kalasa (demography)
David Naudet (macro-economics)
Benoît Ninnin (spatial analysis of settlement and agriculture)
M. Sowa (Ghana case study)

Appendix 2

WEST AFRICA LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY

SELECTED WORKING MATERIAL

Part I presents brief abstracts of the twenty topic working papers produced for WALTPS. Papers 1 to 15 have already been published and are available in at least provisional form. Papers 16 to 20 will be completed and published in the first half of 1994.

Other papers to be written and published in 1994 include, in chronological order: the report of the Scientific Committee meeting held in Brussels on January 17-19, 1994; the summary report completing Round 2 of the study; a paper on the practical implications of WALTPS; and an atlas. The demographic database will also be published in an improved version with maps, in hard copy and on diskette.

Part II gives a list of papers on national case studies. Most are in draft form, and some will be summarized and collected in one publication. Ultimately there should be no more than two or three documents for each of the five countries.

Part III lists by topic the main maps produced for WALTPS with page references to the working papers.

I ABSTRACTS OF WORKING PAPERS 1 TO 20

Working paper 1: **SAH/D(93)402**

Report on the first phase of work (Round 1). Collective authorship. December 1992. 124pp + appendices. English version available.

A summary of the first six months' work, essentially exploratory in nature. Trends in settlement patterns and structuring of space are analyzed, and a first long-term picture given, involving rapid population growth, a continued population shift from inland to the coast, and migration directed towards a small number of countries.

Working paper 2: **SAH/CR(93)80**

Summary of conclusions to Round 1 and report of submission in Abidjan, January 18-19, 1993. 18pp. English version available.

Working paper 3: **SAH/D(93)403**

Trade and space in West Africa. J.O. Igué and B.G. Soule. February 1992. 60pp + appendices.

The nearly seven million square kilometers of West Africa are divided into sixteen States, most of which are not viable economic units. Its artificial political fragmentation is largely counteracted by extensive trade-led integration. This paper describes and analyzes the determining factors of this regional trade (history, discrepant economic and monetary policies, etc.), its impact on the structuring of the region and the opportunity it could provide for the overall land-use planning of West Africa.

Working paper 4: **SAH/D(93)404**

The influence of markets on the distribution of rural population in West Africa. B. Ninnin. July 1993. 29pp + appendices. English abstract with maps available.

Quantitative geography has greatly improved its tools over the last ten years. The spatial dimension of the economy can now be grasped, especially in rural areas. This paper presents the "market attractiveness" approach developed for WALTPS. Market attractiveness can be defined as the influence of urban or international markets on production areas to satisfy their demand. This approach provides a composite indicator of the weight of various markets, their distance, transport costs, marketable surpluses, competition between markets for these surpluses, and competition from imported goods. Maps illustrate market attractiveness produced by the model from data from 700 markets in 1960 and 1990.

Working paper 5: **SAH/D(93)405**

Modeling international trade 1970-90 (structural effects, specific trends) and analysis of models of openness in West Africa. J.D. Naudet (DIAL). February 1993. 33pp + appendices.

The paper constructs and analyzes an econometric model explaining world foreign trade behavior as a function of countries' structural features. In particular it : 1) examines the links between a country's size or population and its openness to foreign trade, and 2) defines theoretical or potential levels for trade between countries, to be used for forecasts or to estimate a region's trade with the rest of the world when combined or divided into countries. West

Africa is analyzed as an example of openness in a region. The analysis shows that West Africa as a whole does not appear to be a special case for exports or imports, given its size, wealth and domestic prices.

Working paper 6: **SAH/D(93)406**

Settlement patterns and economy in West Africa. J.D. Naudet. November 1992. 51pp + appendices.

This paper compares international and West African databases to assess the real economy in West Africa. The results of this analysis are then re-examined according to two deliberately contrasting and controversial demo-economic viewpoints: the **predatory city,** bloated, distorting the natural regulation of relations with the countryside, generating food dependence and unemployment; the **structuring city,** which for all its imbalances creates solvent demand and structures its hinterland.

Working paper 7: **SAH/D(93)407**

Demo-economic modeling of countries undergoing settlement. J.D. Naudet. January 1993. 33pp.

Population in West Africa is usually strangely absent from economic modeling and therefore discussion. Demand models ignore the influence of demography. Supply models assume, often rightly, that the labor supply is unlimited, separating economy from demography. The paper examines ways of integrating population growth and settlement patterns into economic demand models. It starts from the idea that population distribution affects economic behavior. Its hypothesis is that the main cause and effect of population movements is to share income variations throughout society. They therefore regulate internal and external shocks to the economy, by increasing or diminishing their effects.

Working paper 8: **SAH/D(93)410**

Retrospective demo-economic analysis and suggested long-term demo-economic picture of West Africa. J.M. Cour. January 1994. 80pp + appendices.

In the absence of reliable basic statistics, national accounts in West Africa give an incomplete and distorted picture of reality. This paper proposes a complementary picture, just as incomplete and distorted, using demo-economic accounting.

After recapitulating the construction and scope of social accounting matrices (SAMs), the author proposes an overall audit of the demo-economic performance of West Africa from 1960 to 1990. This analysis reveals encouraging features which may lead to faster sustainable economic growth. They are massive, largely private, capital formation, the emergence of significant domestic and regional markets linked to urbanization, and a structural reduction in the rate of population movement which should make it easier to manage. Conversely, West Africa is subject to serious liabilities such as indebtedness, marginal share of world markets, aid fatigue, and demotivated elites. The author uses these positive and negative features to suggest a possible picture of West Africa in 2020.

Working paper 9: **SAH/D(93)411**

Economic prospects for West Africa in the decade ahead. J.D. Naudet (DIAL). November 1993. 62pp. English version available.

This paper assumes that existing features will play the major part in shaping the ten years ahead. They are: a flourishing informal sector, a collapsing modern sector, extensive growth without increased productivity, an economy turned towards the outside world, trade and rent-seeking. The total result, however, is overall economic growth that has kept pace with population growth and coped with new settlement patterns. The author describes long-term trends

in the world economy and West Africa, and then proposes three ten-year scenarios. An **extrapolation scenario,** based on overseas trade and economic rents, in which Nigeria expands in importance in the regional economy and the international community withdraws. A **"multipolar" scenario,** in which the countries of highest potential adopt long-term structural adjustment with the very conditional aid of the international community. And, breaking with existing trends, a **regional integration scenario,** based on economic and monetary integration and aiming for the development of production and trade within West Africa.

Working paper 10: **SAH/D(93)412**

Urbanization in West Africa: local ways and local thinking. M. Arnaud. December 1993. 30pp + appendices. English version available.

This paper describes West African urbanization which, from 1960 to 1980, occurred at three times the highest rate achieved in Europe during the Industrial Revolution. This speed of change explains settlement patterns and land use, and the importance of the informal sector, the preferred "reception area" for new migrants. The city also determines a special social structuring in which "closeness to the authorities" is the main road to individual and collective wealth. The paper deals with meeting basic needs, management of urban land, economic activity and social change in terms of how they have developed and adapted to the economic crisis of the 1980s.

Working paper 11: **SAH/D(93)413**

The influence of markets on the spatial organization of agriculture in West Africa. B. Ninnin. 54pp + appendices. English version available.

The market attractiveness indicator shows that the rural population is distributed largely according to the size and position of markets (Working paper 4). This empirical observation is supported by the correlation between market attractiveness and localized data on farm production and settlement patterns. The comparison also reveals special features in some production areas. The paper suggests a way of measuring the market-led structuring of farming and how this measurement could be used to construct a long-term picture.

Working paper 12: **SAH/D(93)414**

Farm performance and population redistribution in West Africa. J.M. Cour. December 1993. 33pp + appendices. English version available.

From 1930 to 2030 the population of West Africa will have increased tenfold and the urban population one-hundredfold. The farm performance of West Africa over the last thirty years is examined against the background of this enormous population shift. Overall, regional food balances have admittedly deteriorated, as production lags some three years behind demand. But, contrary to widespread opinion, urban eating habits have not become more Western, and West Africa comes second only to the rest of SSA as the region in the world with the lowest per capita food imports. However, poorly recorded intra-regional trade appears to be below expected levels by world standards. The model of farm growth led by domestic demand has not worked well. The problem is analyzed under four main topics: the impact of urban demand on farming, what cities offer the countryside in return for food, more intensive farming, and the macro-economic environment.

Working paper 13: **SAH/D(93)415**

Settlement patterns in West Africa, commentary on the database. B. Kalasa. December 1993. 124pp + appendices.

This paper is a commentary on the demographic database set up for WALTPS: a population explosion unprecedented in history, rapid but fairly balanced urbanization, very varied rural settlement patterns, huge migrations, etc. It

includes extracts from the database for the 19 countries studied (total, urban and rural population 1930-2020, growth rates, internal migration, etc.) and comparative regional tables.

Working paper 14: **SAH/D(93)421**

States, borders and trends in land-use planning in West Africa. J.O. Igué and B.G. Soule. December 1993. 74pp + appendices.

How have the states defined by the colonial division developed their land use? This paper reviews the institutional framework of land-use planning policies and evaluates the achievements (communications, education, healthcare, farming, industry, etc.) of West African countries. With few exceptions it reveals the inconsistency of these policies, which were often poorly framed, deprived of resources, and based on unsuitable areas of land. This unsuitability of territory for policy explains why spontaneous forms of development have arisen, such as networks of markets and border areas. Land-use planning needs to be re-thought; the authors suggest a few ways forward, such as defining policies on the basis of regions that are coherent ecologically and culturally, and quite different from the administrative units which exist for the convenience of government rather than to encourage development.

Working paper 15: **SAH/D(93)417**

Demographic consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in West Africa. J.J. Gabas, M. Postel and B. Kalasa. December 1993. 23pp + appendices.

As for so many other areas, knowledge of the extent of the AIDS epidemic in Africa is limited. What, however, is known for sure, is that, unlike the rest of the world, the mode of transmission in Africa is mostly heterosexual. Its demographic impact will therefore be greater than elsewhere.

Working paper 16:

Social change in West Africa: audit and prospects. M. Diouf. December 1993. 18pp.

This paper summarizes and comments on the conclusions of a meeting held in Dakar on November 16-18, 1993, on political and social change in West Africa. It deals in particular with the need to rethink African States on the basis of true decentralization, a genuine public and democratic culture and the definition of a more responsible citizenship.

Working paper 17: **SAH/D(93)424**

Locating road networks in West Africa. B. Ninnin. January 1994. 37pp + appendices.

Roads contribute to economic development by reducing transport costs between areas of production and consumption. This paper correlates the theoretical market attractiveness indicator (Working paper 4) with an indicator of road quality, the capital per kilometer invested in main roads. The correlation shows that the West African road network has developed basically to meet the growing need to transport farm produce to markets; the wide discrepancies in road quality between countries are explained by equally wide discrepancies in the transport needs to supply a country's markets.

Working paper 18

A new shape for the democratic African State. A. Bourgi, P.H. Chalvidan, E. Fall and P. Weiss. November 1993. 20pp.

This paper contains the discussions of the working party on political and social change in West Africa set up by the CINERGIE unit. From 1960 to 1990 in Africa, only Mauritius attempted a democratic change of government; the

hundred or so other changes were *coups d'état*. In the past four years, the principle of democratic change of government has affected one African country in five. But in most cases democratic government does not seem to be able to cope at once with financial pressures and immediate demands from regions and interest groups. Consequently the democratic State of the future needs to be rethought (Working paper 16).

Working paper 19:

Hydro-agricultural potential; interim summary report on surface and underground water resources. Senagrhy. October 1993. 81pp.

This paper is the first stage in mapping resources. Part 1 is an overall description, ignoring state borders, of surface and underground water resources. Part 2 gives details for each of the 19 countries.

Working paper 20:

Hydro-agricultural potential: water resource mapping. Senagrhy. December 1993. 6pp + appendices.

This paper comprises maps of the region's water resources (Working paper 19). The resources are divided into continuous and discontinuous aquifers. They are classified by hydraulic features and potential, based on the value of their renewable resources, static reserves and available flows.

II NATIONAL CASE STUDIES

This list only includes drafts that have been received by the Club du Sahel secretariat and the CINERGIE unit. Some are due to be summarized and published in single documents.

Burkina Faso

- National case study. Summary.

Ghana

- A study of urban-rural linkages in Ghana. S.T. Addo, K. Adarkwa, November 1993.
- Regional development and land use in Ghana. G. Botchie, December 1993.
- Population dynamics, urbanization and migration in Ghana. J.S. Nabila, A.F. Aryee, November 1993.
- Regional integration issues in Ghana. K.A. Ninsin, J. Bok Abban, December 1993.
- Structure and growth prospects of the economy of Ghana from a demo-economic perspective. N.K. Sowa, December 1993.

Mali

- Historical trends. Demo-economic analysis of nomadism. December 1993.
- Population movement and spatial distribution of the economy. S. Diarra, B. Sacko, November 1993.
- Land-use planning policies. Ousmane M. Diallo, November 1993.
- City/countryside relations in Mali. B. Sanogo, January 1994.

Nigeria

- The history and contemporary trends in Nigeria. Rural-urban migration and urbanization. D.J. Abin, A. Bello University, Zaria Nigeria. August 1993.
- Population and socio-economic change in southeastern Nigeria. B. Ahonsi, A. Olukoshi.
- Population, space and development in Nigeria. The southwestern case. J.A. Ariyo. November 1993.
- The southwestern Nigeria case study. A. Momoh, Lagos State University.
- Population change and socio-economic processes in the Nigerian Middle Belt. Z.A. Bonat, A. Bello University.
- Population, space and development in Nigeria. Summary of the Lagos Workshop. Jibrin Ibrahim, November 1993.
- Population, space and development in northern Nigeria. J. Ibrahim.
- Population dynamics in eastern Nigeria and their socio-economic and political consequences. A.O. Olukoshi, B. Ahonsi.

Senegal

- Cities in Senegal. Momar C. Diop, Amadou Diop, December 1993.
- Cities in Senegal. Report of the Dakar meeting. December 1993.

III SELECTED MAPS

Many other maps have been produced, particularly for Working papers 4, 11 and 17 (B. Ninnin). Some maps are to be found in more than one paper, in which case the page reference is generally to the first one.

POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

Territorial divisions in West Africa
Working paper 14, p 45.
States, borders and trends in land-use planning...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule

The four main settlement zones
Working paper 13, p 29.
Settlement patterns in West Africa...
B. Kalasa.

The fifty biggest cities in West Africa in 1990
Working paper 13, p 125.
Settlement patterns in West Africa...
B. Kalasa.

Urban networks in West Africa
Working paper 14, p 51.
States, borders and trends in land-use planning in West Africa.
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Rural population density in 1960
Working paper 4, pp 14, 15.
The influence of markets on the distribution...
B. Ninnin.

Rural population density in 1990
Working paper 4, pp 22, 23.
The influence of markets on the distribution...
B. Ninnin.

HIV1 and HIV2 infection rates
(urban high- and low-risk populations)
Working paper 15, pp 7-10.
Demographic consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic...
J. Gabas, M. Postel, B. Kalasa.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Transport infrastructure in 1960 and 1990
Working paper 4, pp 35, 36.
The influence of markets on the distribution...
B. Ninnin.

Appearance of asphalt roads
Working paper 4, p 37.
The influence of markets on the distribution...
B. Ninnin.

Road network in 1960, 1968, 1978, 1984 and 1989
Working paper 17, pp 4, 6, 8, 10, 12.
Locating road networks
B. Ninnin.

Communication infrastructure and harbor installations
Working paper 14, p 63.
States, borders and trends in land-use planning in West Africa.
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Healthcare and education infrastructure
Working paper 14, p 54.
States, borders and trends in land-use planning in West Africa.
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

AGRICULTURE

Agro-climatic suitability
Working paper 4, p 39.
The influence of markets on the distribution...
B. Ninnin.

Underground water resources
Working paper 20, p 2.
Hydro-agricultural potential...
Senagrhy

Estimated arable areas
Working paper 4, p 9.
The influence of markets on the distribution...
B. Ninnin.

Yields and shares of arable land
(millet, sorghum, maize, rice, wheat, soya, legumes, yams, cassava, groundnut, cotton, coffee, cocoa)
Working paper 11, Appendix B, pp vi-xii.
The influence of markets on the spatial organization...
B. Ninnin.

Share of arable land
(other cereals, other tubers, coconut, rubber, sugarcane, oil-palm, bananas, fruit, vegetables)
Working paper 11, Appendix B, pp xiii-xv.
The influence of markets on the spatial organization...
B. Ninnin.

Production of plant calories in 1990
(per capita farm population)
Working paper 11, p 35.
The influence of markets on the spatial organization...
B. Ninnin.

Surpluses in plant calories in 1990
(per total area)
Working paper 11, p 19.
The influence of markets on the spatial organization...
B. Ninnin.

TRADE

Market attractiveness in 1960
Working paper 4, p 7.
The influence of markets on the distribution...
B. Ninnin.

Market attractiveness in 1990
Working paper 4, p 21.
The influence of markets on the distribution...
B. Ninnin.

Border areas in West Africa
Working paper 14, p 12.
States, borders and trends in land-use planning in West Africa.
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

States and trade routes, 8th to 16th centuries
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Political entities and trade routes, 16th to 19th centuries
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Livestock and cola trade
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Local cereal trade
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Tuber and legume trade
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Market garden produce and fruit trade
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Cash crop flows
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Trade in national manufactured goods
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Re-export trade
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Trade areas
Working paper 3, Appendix 2.
Trade and space...
J.O. Igué, B.G. Soule.

Appendix 3: meeting agenda

MONDAY, JANUARY 17

1. Detailed introduction

Opening remarks (Brah);
Role of WALTPS (Stacy);
Presentation of research done since November 1992 and meeting agenda (Seye);
Presentation of data collected for WALTPS (Snrech).

2. Summary of research into spatial dynamics and land use planning

Presentation by John Igué; presentation by Benoît Ninnin; discussion.
Reaction based on case studies: Mali (Dème); Ghana (Sowa).
Evening: free session on spatial modeling.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 18

3. Summary of research on the economy

Presentation by David Naudet; presentation by Jean-Marie Cour; debate.
Reaction based on case studies: Ghana (Sowa); Burkina Faso (Kaboré); discussion.

4. Summary of research on political and social change

Introduction; presentation by Mamadou Diouf; discussion.
Reaction based on case studies: Nigeria (Olukushi); Mali (Dème).
Evening: free session on the methodology of demo-economic analysis.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19

5. Perspectives and scenarios

Introduction; settlement patterns (Kalasa); long-term picture (Cour); medium-term scenarios (Naudet); social and political perspectives (Diouf); discussion.

6. Definition by Committee members of monitoring procedures for further research and recommendations in the light of WALTPS

Further research, timetable, contacts with the Scientific Committee, circulation (Pradelle, Seye);
Recommendation for research (Cour);
Recommendations for policy-makers (Brah, Stacy).

Appendix 4: Opening remarks by Mr. Mahamane BRAH.

First of all, I should like to express once more our gratitude to the authorities of the Commission of the European Communities for their continual support.

Ever since the West Africa Long Term Perspective Study began, we have received support and encouragement from the Commission to help us pursue the objectives contained in the study's terms of reference as approved by the donors' meeting on funding the study, held on January 31, 1992 at the headquarters of the OECD.

On behalf of us all, I should like to thank the Commission not only for that continual support but also for making us welcome in this symbolic place, Eurovillage, on the occasion of the second meeting of the WALTPS Scientific Committee.

My thanks go also to the members of the Scientific Committee who have responded to our invitation and our expectations, as they did in November 1992 in Abidjan. Their presence here reflects their commitment and the priority they place on the successful completion of this major study. On behalf of all the members of the team in charge of the study, I thank them.

I could hardly overlook the thirty or so West African consultants and the dozen European consultants, who, quite apart from their contribution to the research, have become almost members of our family.

The presence here in Brussels of the five coordinators of the West African teams of consultants is evidence that WALTPS is not the work of a single consultant or a single team. It is the work of a vast network of talents from both North and South. Since the Scientific Committee is made up of five Northerners and five Southerners, we are duty bound to reflect this spirit of partnership in the action we take.

The originality of WALTPS is that it is designed to be a joint achievement; it must remain a joint enterprise if we want the strategic discussion of the major changes and trends in West Africa to be widely shared.

The second originality is that our study boldly considers economic, social and political realities from the point of view of changing settlement patterns. It is true that the West African subregion (like the other subregions) is at present going through a particularly difficult phase in its existence. War, famine, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, debt, bankrupt States: this is the apocalyptic picture we present to the world. It is a terrible picture, but only a partial one. Africa is more than the sum of its misfortunes.

Even if these misfortunes are real, we would wish to suggest a different interpretation to reduce, or even eliminate, what is called Afro-pessimism. That is the second originality of WALTPS.

Its third originality is that it examines the long term. This is not an easy exercise. Long-term thinking implies being able to stand back from the present, a present which for both Africans and their partners is made up of daily, urgent demands. But stand back we must, to look beyond the hills to the plain, to see the wood for the trees. Only a clear perception of what

is at stake in the future can avoid us taking paths that lead nowhere. If we know where to go, we shall be better able to take the right steps now.

This meeting of the Scientific Committee is an important stage in the process in which we are engaged together. Your comments and suggestions at the first meeting in Abidjan helped us to enrich our analysis and understand better the structural changes in settlement, the economy and society in West Africa.

We have been able to carry out case studies to prove or disprove some of our working hypotheses. Complementary topic studies have produced more material for our databases. All this research is now available, and we hope that it will be widely discussed.

Your comments and suggestions enable us to produce an overall report on the structural changes in the subregion from 1960 to 1990.

Although we have concentrated on analyzing the past for a better understanding of the present, we have begun to sketch out some scenarios for future changes in West Africa.

From the criticisms you make of the presentations here, we shall be able to adopt, modify or eliminate some of the ways forward we have suggested.

I should like to finish by apologizing to the members of the Scientific Committee for not sending them all the research material one month before this meeting. I must confess that for practical reasons we were quite unable to do so.

May I hope that despite this inadequacy the three days we shall spend together will enable us to make a great step forward in our common enterprise.

Let us remember that, over and above the clear, motivating vision we are bound to produce, our study must of necessity lead towards strategic and political choices to make that vision a reality. WALTPS must ultimately contain practical implications for States and development agencies. It is, I believe, our great ambition to arrive at a *modus operandi* that is widely, if not unanimously, shared.

Beyond these day-to-day practical considerations, Ladies and Gentlemen, there is a wider question: where are we heading? Where is West Africa heading? For if there is one thing of which we may be sure, it is that the nineteen West African countries in our study will one day have a population of 420 million.

Answering these questions requires standing back from the present. To look beyond the hills to the plain, to see the wood for the trees.

Answering these questions requires a diagnosis of the spatial, economic, social and political implications of settlement patterns.

It is on that note of hope that I wish to conclude, expressing once more our thanks to you all.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE WEST AFRICA LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE STUDY

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Operating costs are financed by organizations including the World Bank and the European Commission. The aims of the CINERGIE unit are as follows :
— to improve dialogue between Sahelian countries, coastal countries along the Gulf of Guinea, and donor agencies,
— to highlight obstacles to trade,
— to assist African leaders and policy-makers in taking the realities of regional cooperation into account in their decisions.

On the basis of the findings of the WALTPS study, CINERGIE will draw up a **joint action program** in West Africa, incorporating a series of recommendations for the region's governments and for donor agencies.

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